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THE BACKLASH THESIS AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
LEARNING FROM BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND ITS AFTERMATH
Carlos A. Ball*
INTRODUCTION
The last three years have been like no other time in the history of the gay rights
movement. During that period, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states cannot crimi-
nalize gay sexual conduct,' Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriages,2 and
Connecticut created the institution of civil unions for lesbian and gay couples.' In
that same period, the President and many members of Congress endorsed a proposed
federal constitutional amendment that would prohibit states from recognizing same-
sex marriages.4 In addition, fifteen states amended their constitutions to prohibit
same-sex marriages, and most of those provisions also ban alternative forms of legal
recognition (such as civil unions and domestic partnerships) of same-sex relation-
ships.' From a gay rights perspective, in other words, it seems as if lately every
encouraging victory is soon followed by a troubling defeat.
This article attempts to make sense of the current period in the struggle for gay
rights by putting it in a broader historical context. The article focuses in particular
on an earlier period in American history when a judicial opinion, that of Brown v.
Board of Education,6 prompted a severe political and legal backlash.7 There are
interesting similarities between the backlash that followed Brown and that which
has followed the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's same-sex marriage opinion
* Visiting Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law at Camden; Professor of
Law, Penn State University. I would like to thank the organizers of and participants in the sym-
posium, especially Michael Stein. I would also like to thank Alfred Brophy and Victor Romero
for stimulating conversations that helped me clarify several of the points I make in this article.
Finally, I would like to thank Burgess Bradshaw (Penn State Class of 2006) for her superb
research assistance.
' Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
3 William Yardley, Connecticut Approves Civil Unions for Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2005, at B5.
a See infra notes 64, 67 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 165-84 and accompanying text. The fifteen states are: Arkansas, Georgia,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, North Dakota, Texas, and Utah.
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 See infra Part II.A.
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in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.8 In fact, the gay rights movement can
learn important lessons from these similarities. One lesson is that political and legal
backlashes are a foreseeable consequence of controversial judicial victories that
require majority groups to reassess in fundamental ways the manner in which they
have in the past treated and understood certain minority groups. A second related
lesson is that civil rights struggles in this country have traditionally consisted of
moments of heartening progress followed by instances of discouraging setbacks.
The current backlash has created considerable anxiety within the gay rights move-
ment as many have questioned whether the same-sex marriage litigation has back-
fired by, in effect, encouraging social conservatives to flex their political muscles
to the detriment of lesbians and gay men.9 I argue in this article that despite the
harmful backlash experienced by the gay rights movement following marriage cases
such as Goodridge, lesbians and gay men are nonetheless better off as a result of
those cases. The gains from the litigation, in other words, have so far outweighed
the losses.
The article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I compare the period immediately
after Brown with the one immediately after Goodridge to explore how the plaintiffs
in both cases were faced with similarly crucial decisions about whether to moderate
their demands for judicial relief in the face of growing political opposition.1° In
Part II, I examine the similarities in the backlash that followed each opinion." Both
opinions politically galvanized conservatives, leading to many changes in state laws,
including the approval of several constitutional amendments. 2 In Part II, I discuss
what has become known as the Brown backlash thesis. 13 That thesis holds that
Brown did not, at least in the short run, contribute meaningfully to the undermining
of segregation in the South because of the massive resistance that the opinion pro-
voked among white southerners.'" I note in Part I that some have made similar
arguments in the aftermath of Goodridge by contending that the opinion has been,
at least in the short run, largely unhelpful to the attainment of gay rights goals
because of the backlash that it has provoked among conservatives. 5 In Part IV, I
disagree with gay rights supporters who have criticized same-sex marriage cases such
as Goodridge by arguing that the benefits arising from the lawsuits have so far out-
weighed the backlash-related costs. 6 I finish Part IV, however, by suggesting that
the gains from the marriage litigation are unlikely to continue at the same pace in
8 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
9 See infra notes 222-37 and accompanying text.
'o See infra Part I.
" See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part Ill
14 See infra Part III.
" See infra notes 222-37 and accompanying text.
16 See infra Part IV.
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the future and that the same-sex marriage movement must begin to pay greater
attention to the legislative and political arenas and (proportionally) less attention to
the courts. 7
I. THE REMEDIAL AFrERMATHS OF BROWN AND GOODRIDGE
One of the many interesting similarities between Brown and Goodridge is that,
as important as the two opinions were for the issues of school desegregation and same-
sex marriage respectively, the decisions were also, in crucial ways, incomplete. Brown
held that school segregation on the basis of race was unconstitutional, but left reme-
dial questions for another day.'8 Goodridge held that the ban against same-sex mar-
riage violated the liberty and equality provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, but
was somewhat ambiguous as to the issue of remedies. 9 Goodridge did not make
explicit, for example, whether providing same-sex couples with an alternative legal
structure to marriage, such as that offered by civil unions, was sufficient to correct
the marriage ban's constitutional defects as identified in the opinion."
As a result, in both instances, crucial remedial issues remained unresolved until
after the respective courts issued subsequent opinions. The periods between the
first and second opinions in Brown and in Goodridge raise similar questions about
what kind of legal strategy should be pursued by civil rights advocates given grow-
ing public disenchantment with previous judicial victories. On both occasions, the
plaintiffs' lawyers chose to continue demanding full and immediate equality, even
in the face of growing public opposition.
A. The Period Between Brown I and Brown II
Fifty-four weeks elapsed between the issuance of the first opinion in Brown,
known as Brown I, and the subsequent opinion, known as Brown II, in which the
Court addressed the remedial issues.2' The reaction to Brown Iby many blacks was
'7 See infra notes 304-08 and accompanying text.
18 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
'9 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968-70 (Mass. 2003).
20 See Pam Belluck, Marriage by Gays Gains Big Victory in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2003, at Al (noting that legal experts disagreed on whether Goodridge allowed for
civil unions as a permissible alternative to marriage); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Massachusetts
Gets It Right, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 21 (noting that the Goodridge court "appears
to be saying that the Massachusetts legislature could satisfy its constitutional duty by recog-
nizing civil unions").
21 In this article, I refer to the first Brown opinion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as Brown I only
when necessary to contrast it to the second Brown opinion, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Otherwise,
I refer to the former simply as Brown.
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one ofjubilation and optimism. 22 At the time, Brown I represented a crowning achieve-
ment in a long struggle for civil rights, one that began with the Civil War and the
subsequent adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, seemed to take root in the
Reconstruction period, and then stalled for decades as de jure segregation spread
unimpeded to every comer of the South.23 By the time Brown I was decided in
1954, the NAACP, under the stewardship of Thurgood Marshall, had for years been
chipping away at Jim Crow laws by challenging race-based restrictions on the right
to vote and racial segregation in higher education, housing, and transportation.2 4
Only after initial victories in these areas were firmly in place, did the NAACP turn
its full attention to what was the most sensitive issue for many whites across the
country - that of racial segregation in primary and secondary schools.25 When the
Supreme Court unanimously held in Brown I that segregated schools were unconsti-
tutional, it seemed that true racial equality was within reach for the first time in
American history.
The initial response to Brown I by southern conservatives was at first muted.26
Governors Francis Cherry of Arkansas and James Folsom of Alabama, for example,
stated shortly after the opinion was issued that they would obey the law as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court.27 Compliance with the ruling in border states like
Delaware, West Virginia, and Kentucky began almost immediately.28 In the summer
of 1954, the school systems in Baltimore, Louisville, St. Louis, and Washington
22 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALrY 717 (2004); JAMEs T. PATTERSON, BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 70-71
(2001). Thurgood Marshall, the day after the Brown Iopinion was issued, told the New York
Times that school segregation in the U.S. would end within five years. See KLUGER, supra,
at 717.
23 See ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS
MOvEMENT 4 (1990).
24 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 196-225 (2004).
25 See id. at 290-91. Similarly, the same-sex marriage lawsuit in Massachusetts was filed
only after decades of successful efforts, before both the state legislature and state courts, to
advance gay rights positions. See Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 8-17 (2005). Some of the earlier victories included the passage of a state law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the expansion of hate crimes
legislation to cover sexual orientation, and the ruling inAdoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315
(Mass. 1993), which made it possible for same-sex couples to adopt jointly. See Bonauto,
supra, at 10-14.
26 See PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 72.
27 Id.; see also JOHN A. SALMOND, "MY MIND SET ON FREEDOM": A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1954-1968, at 27 (1997) (noting that in the "crucial first weeks after the
Brown decision... [, a] number of political and social leaders counseled compliance, or at least
moderation").
28 See PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 72.
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D.C. all took significant steps to desegregate and continued those efforts into the
following academic year.29
Despite these early promising signs, there were also indications of mounting
resistance by segregationists. The first troubling incident took place in the southern
Delaware town of Milford after school officials, in the late summer of 1954, admitted
eleven black children to the white high school.30 A meeting of white parents was soon
called and about 1,500 parents and other locals attended.3 A petition in support of
segregation was circulated at the meeting, and threats of violence were made.32 In
response, the school board temporarily closed down the high school.33 Outside agi-
tators soon flocked to Milford rallying white parents, threatening violence, and burn-
ing crosses?34 When the high school did reopen, most white parents kept their children
at home; shortly thereafter, the boycott spread to neighboring towns.35 As a result of
political pressure, the Milford school board dissolved, and the new one decided to end
the effort to desegregate the high school. 36 The NAACP sought judicial intervention,
but it would be another eight years before blacks were admitted to Milford's white
schools.37
With the opposition and resistance to Brown I growing in the South,38 the NAACP,
as it prepared for arguments in Brown II, was faced with a crucial strategic decision:
Should it return to the Court with a "gradualist position" that recognized the need
for some delay in the desegregation of schools in some parts of the country, or should
it continue to demand the immediate desegregation of schools across the nation?39
Marshall's advisors were divided on this point.' Some argued on behalf of the former
29 See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 723. In fact, by 1955, seventy percent of school districts
in the border states had at least some classrooms with both black and white students. See
PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 75.
30 See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 723-24 (describing the events that took place in Milford
in 1954); see also PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 72-75.
31 PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 73.
32 id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 74-75.
3 Id. at 75.
36 id.
37 Id.
38 "Five weeks [after Brown], the governor of Virginia, who had greeted the... decision
with moderate words and the pledge to consult with leaders of both races, declared: 'I shall
use every legal means at my command to continue segregated schools in Virginia."' KLUGER,
supra note 22, at 717. The day after Brown was issued, the school board of Greensboro,
North Carolina, voted to obey the ruling. See PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 72. A few weeks
later, however, the board made clear that it would not attempt to desegregate schools any
time soon. See id. at 79. In fact, Greensboro did not begin to desegregate schools until 1971
when it was explicitly ordered to do so by the courts. See id.
39 KLUGER, supra note 22, at 725.
40 See id.
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strategy, contending that the Court was likely to appreciate moderation on such an
explosive issue. 4' These advisors contended that if the NAACP was willing to mod-
erate its demands regarding the timing of desegregation, that might prevent the
further hardening of resistance among southern whites.42 One of the benefits of a
gradualist position was that it would provide an opportunity to change (or at least
mollify) hostile community attitudes in the South, which, it was argued, had to take
place before court-ordered desegregation could proceed in a meaningful way.43
Other NAACP insiders, however, disagreed. The sociologist Kenneth Clark,
who was a close advisor to Marshall" and whose work the Court cited in Brown J,45
contended that attitude changes were not necessary in order to modify behavior.46
Clark argued, in other words, that opponents of desegregation would go along with
what the courts required of them even if they strongly disagreed with those demands.47
To wait for attitudes to change, Clark contended, would entail a long wait indeed.48
To countenance delay, Clark and others pointed out, would only give opponents of
integration the opportunity to further harden their resistance. As one of Clark's
associates put it:
When we try to solve the conflict to accord with their consciences
as Americans, we naturally arouse all the protests and threats and
dying gasps of their prejudices .... But let the backbone come
from the Supreme Court, and it will strengthen the moral back-
bone of those who now live in conflict.... Let the line of public
morality be set by authoritative pronouncements, and all the latent
good in individuals and communities will be strengthened.49
41 The most important advocate of the gradualist position was William Coleman. See id.
at 725-26. Coleman was the first black person to serve as a law clerk on the Supreme Court
and had been a trusted advisor to Marshall for many years. See id. at 292-93.
42 See id. at 725-26.
13 See id. Jack Weinstein, for example, then a professor at Columbia Law School and an
advisor to the NAACP, was leery of asking the Court to order the immediate desegregation
of schools without an attempt by desegregation supporters to prepare and educate local
populations. See id. at 725.
44 See id. at 723.
15 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 n.ll (1954).
46 As Clark put it, "The hypothesis that attitudinal and other subjective changes are neces-
sary antecedents to behavioral changes is not supported by the empirical data .... On the
contrary, th[e] data suggests that situationally determined behavioral changes generally
precede any observable attitudinal changes." KLUGER, supra note 22, at 722.
47 Id.
48 Id. Clark explained that "[p]rompt, decisive action on the part of recognized authorities
usually results in less anxiety and less resistance [than] a more hesitant and gradual pro-
cedure. It is similar to the effect of quickly pulling off adhesive tape - the pain is sharper
but briefer and more tolerable." PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 114.
49 KLUGER, supra note 22, at 722 (quoting Harvard professor Gordon Allport).
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In the end, after extensive internal debate, the NAACP rejected the gradualist
strategy and instead demanded in its brief to the Court in Brown II that desegregation
begin immediately."0 At issue in the case, the NAACP reminded the Court, were the
constitutional rights of the black plaintiffs as determined in Brown 0s' The enforce-
ment of those rights should not be delayed "because of anticipation of difficulties
arising out of local feelings."52 The brief urged the Court not to allow objections
based on local mores and customs to stand in the way of enforceable rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3
The brief also explicitly rejected the position that a gradualist approach would
be more effective than an order requiring immediate desegregation.54 It questioned
the view that "change in attitude must precede change in action" by pointing to a
"considerable body of evidence," which showed that when an individual is required
to "act as if he were not prejudiced, he will so act, despite the continuance, at least
temporarily, of the prejudice."55 The brief ended by urging the Court to require de-
segregation by the beginning of the 1955-1956 school year.56
In contrast, the defendant states asked the Court to delay meaningful desegre-
gation until public opinion in the South had accepted the advisability of racially mixed
schools.57 In the end, the Court charted a middle course of sorts by adopting a gradualist
position that called on the defendants to admit the plaintiffs to schools in a nondis-
criminatory manner "as soon as practicable.""8 In doing so, however, the Court noted
that district courts would have to deal with a series of obstacles to the effectuation of
the plaintiffs' interests and that it was permissible for them to take into account those
obstacles in reviewing desegregation plans.59 The Court ended with what would be-
come its (in)famous instruction that desegregation should proceed "with all deliberate
speed." 60
As discussed below, southern states responded to the flexibility demonstrated
by the Court in Brown II not by compromising and gradually desegregating, but in-
stead by doing everything they could, including the approval of state constitutional
" Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and for Respondents in No. 5 on Further Re-
argument at 10-23, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), 1954 WL 45729.
5' Id. at 10-11.
52 Id. at 14.
53 Id.
Id. at 17.
5 Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
56 Id. at31.
5' For a summary of the arguments raised by the defendants in Brown 11, see KLUGER,
supra note 22, at 726-29.
58 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II).
59 See id. The Court stated that it would be proper for the lower courts to consider ob-
stacles to immediate desegregation on matters related to, inter alia, school administration,
transportation, and the physical condition of buildings. Id.
60 Id. at 301.
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amendments and the enactment of new laws, to impede school desegregation.6' The
Court implicitly encouraged this resistance by failing to make clear, in the years that
followed Brown II, that the growing efforts taken by southern states to obstruct
desegregation were constitutionally unacceptable.6"
We will, of course, never know how the southern states would have responded
if the Court in Brown 11 had called for the immediate desegregation of public schools.
It is difficult to imagine, however, how that response could have been much worse,
in terms of concerted efforts to oppose and resist desegregation, than what actually
took place in the years that followed the opinion. Hindsight makes it relatively easy
to agree with Kenneth Clark and others that it is unrealistic, when facing a regime
of entrenched inequality, to wait to change the minds of resistors before one attempts
to change their behavior. The Court in Brown II sought to accommodate Southern
white sensibilities and concerns by refusing either to call for immediate desegrega-
tion or to establish a precise timetable for such. The result was that ten years after
Brown I, only 1.2 percent of black children in the eleven states that made up the old
Confederacy attended schools with whites.63
B. The Period Between Goodridge and the Advisory Opinion
The response on the part of social conservatives to Goodridge was both im-
mediate and forceful. On the day the opinion was issued, President George W.
Bush released a statement promising that he would work with Congressional leaders
"to do what is legally necessary to defend the sanctity of marriage. ' '64 Republican
Representative Tom Delay, the then-House majority leader, denounced what he
deemed a "runaway judiciary."65 For their part, conservative advocacy groups strongly
61 See infra notes 117-46 and accompanying text.
62 The Court provided full review of only one school desegregation case between 1956
and 1963. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that the threat of disorder in de-
segregating Little Rock's Central High School was not a sufficient ground for delaying dese-
gregation).
63 PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 113. Mississippi was the last state to begin desegregation.
See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During the
Decade After Brown, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 92, 94 (1994). In 1964, no black children in Missis-
sippi attended school with white children. See id. The pace of school desegregation in the border
states was considerably faster than in the South, but even in those states, almost half of the black
children attended all-black schools in 1964. See PATTERSON, supra, at 78.
64 Belluck, supra note 20.
65 Adam Nagourney, A Thorny Issue for 2004 Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at Al.
The criticism of the judiciary became a central theme of opponents of same-sex marriage.
See, e.g., Susan Milligan, Lawmakers Voice Concern for States' Rights, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 25, 2004, at B6 (quoting President Bush as saying that "[a]fter more than two centuries
of American jurisprudence and millennia of human experience, a few judges and local
authorities are presuming to change the most fundamental institution of civilization.");
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criticized the Court and called on elected officials to defend the institution of hetero-
sexual marriage.6' A few days after Goodridge was decided, five Republican U.S.
senators proposed a constitutional amendment that would limit marriage to the
union of a man and a woman. 67 A national poll taken several weeks later found that
fifty-five percent of Americans favored the constitutional amendment, while forty
percent opposed it.68
Meanwhile, Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, on the day the Goodridge
opinion was issued, stated that he "disagreed deeply" with the court and that he was
prepared to fight for a state constitutional amendment that would limit marriage to
different-sex couples.69 Several members of the state legislature concurred on the
need for such an amendment.7" The Massachusetts Family Institute, an advocacy
group opposed to same-sex marriages, announced that it would work with conser-
vative organizations from across the country to lobby and petition against their
recognition.7 National conservative groups such as Operation Rescue and the Christian
Family Coalition pledged support for promoting political opposition to same-sex
marriage inside Massachusetts.72 In addition, the state's Catholic Bishops issued
a statement referring to the court's decision as "a national tragedy" and endorsing
the idea of amending the state constitution.73
Support for same-sex marriage, however, was greater in Massachusetts than in
the rest of the country. 74 A poll of Massachusetts residents conducted a few days
after Goodridge was decided found that fifty percent of respondents supported the
Editorial, The Road to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, §4, at 12 (stating that
"[o]pponents of gay marriage have tried to place all of the blame for recent events on 'activist
judges."'). In the Senate, John Comyn (R-Tex.) "called for a Congressional investigation of
'judicial invalidation of traditional marriage laws."' Id.
6 Katharine Q. Seelye, Conservatives Mobilize Against Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A29.
67 See Mary Leonard, Foes of Same-Sex Marriage Welcome Proposed Constitutional
Amendment, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 27, 2003, at A12. An identical resolution was proposed
in the U.S. House of Representatives the previous May, drawing 100 co-sponsors. See id.
68 Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support Is Found for Ban on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, §1, at 1.
69 Kathleen Burge, Gays Have Right to Marry, SJC Says in Historic Ruling, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2003, at Al.
70 Raphael Lewis, Gay Marriage Debate Splits Democrats, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9,2004,
at B 1; Frank Phillips & Rick Klein, Lawmakers Are Divided on Response, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 19, 2003, at Al.
71 See Raphael Lewis. Groups Muster to Fight Gay Marriage in Mass., BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 20, 2003, at Al.
72 Id.
73 Jenna Russell, Bishops CallSJCDecision "Tragedy", BOSTONGLOBE, Nov. 30, 2003,
at B 1.
71 See Frank Phillips & Rick Klein, 50% in Poll Back SJC Ruling on Gay Marriage,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2003, at Al.
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opinion while thirty-eight percent opposed it.7" In the same poll, fifty-three percent
opposed a state constitutional amendment while thirty-six percent supported it.76
In addition, early indications were that a significant number of state legislators op-
posed a constitutional amendment if it would ban both same-sex marriage and civil
unions.77
Given the political atmosphere in the state, which seemed to favor providing
same-sex relationships with at least some form of legal recognition, the idea of making
civil unions available to same-sex couples, while limiting marriage to different-sex
couples, soon emerged as a compromise position. 7' Toward that end, the state senate,
three weeks after Goodridge, asked the state supreme court whether a proposed bill
that would grant same-sex couples, through the institution of civil unions, the same
rights and benefits provided by state law to married couples while withholding from
them the status of marriage, would pass constitutional muster.7 9
When civil unions were first created by the Vermont legislature in 2000,80 some
gay rights advocates embraced the development as an important and significant step
toward full equality for lesbians and gay men. Professor William Eskridge, for ex-
ample, in his book Equality Practice: Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights,
argued in favor of the pragmatism and gradualism represented by civil unions.8' The
danger of demanding full marriage equality too quickly on an "unwilling populace,"
Eskridge noted, was that it encouraged a majoritarian backlash via the ballot box. 2
Other gay rights supporters, however, were highly critical of civil unions because they
viewed their creation as a means toward the institutionalization of separate equality
for lesbians and gay men. 3 In fact, critics often analogized between civil unions and
"2 See id.
76 See id.
" See Raphael Lewis, In Lawmaker Poll, Few Back Limiting Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 1, 2003, at B 1.
78 See id.
71 See Frank Phillips, Senate Eyes Civil Union Bill for SJC, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11,
2003, at Al; Senate Progresses on Civil Union Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2003, at B8.
80 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2002).
81 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
GAY RIGHTS 147-58 (2002).
82 Id. at 148. For further discussion of Eskridge's position on civil unions, see infra notes
221-25 and accompanying text. Greg Johnson also argued that gay rights proponents should
embrace civil unions. Greg Johnson, In Praise of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 315 (2002);
Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15
(2000).
83 See, e.g., YUvALMERJN, EQUALTY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION
OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 293-94 (2002); Barbara Cox,
But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and
Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 124-47 (2000); Andrew Sullivan, State of the
Union, NEw REPUBLIC, May 8, 2000, at 18.
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the type of segregation that was upheld by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson.'
From this perspective, the separate but equal component of civil unions legitimated
and maintained the second-class citizenship status of lesbians and gay men.85
When the Massachusetts senate sought an advisory opinion from the state's high-
est court on the constitutionality of civil unions, the lawyers at Gay and Lesbian
Advocate and Defenders (GLAD) - the organization that represented the plaintiffs
in Goodridge - were faced with a dilemma similar to the one confronted by the
NAACP lawyers fifty years earlier.86 The GLAD attorneys, like their earlier counter-
parts at the NAACP, had to decide whether (1) to adopt, in the face of the political
firestorm that followed their initial legal victory, a gradualist strategy that accepted
an outcome that fell short of complete equality, or (2) to continue to press for im-
mediate full equality. The GLAD lawyers, like the advocates at the NAACP in the
mid-1950s, chose the latter option.
In its brief to the state supreme court on the question presented to it by the state
senate, GLAD emphasized that the proposed civil union bill failed to address the
constitutional infirmities found in Goodridge.87 In particular, the GLAD brief re-
minded the court that in Goodridge, it had emphasized not only the tangible benefits
that accompany marriage, but also the intangible ones that make marriage a defining
personal choice in our society.8 The brief noted that Goodridge held that the ban
against same-sex marriage violated not only principles of equality under the state
constitution, but also those of due process and liberty.89 This meant that the creation
of a different institution that purportedly sought to provide the same benefits as
marriage was constitutionally problematic because it did not address the due process
and liberty interests implicated by the institution of marriage.9"
The brief also contended that, from an equality perspective, civil unions fell far
short of what the state constitution required. Only by having access to the institu-
tion of marriage will "the plaintiffs ... be understood to share the love and commit-
ment of spouses, and all the protections, benefits and obligations that flow from that
culturally unique status."'" The use of the word "marriage," the brief argued, matters
84 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See MERIN, supra note 83, at 294; Cox, supra note 83, at 124-28.
81 MERIN, supra note 83, at 294; Cox, supra note 83, at 124-47. Eskridge questioned the
analogy between civil unions and racial segregation. ESKRIDGE, supra note 81, at 139-47.
The Vermont supreme court's opinion in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), Eskridge
argued, "is much more like Brown than like Plessy," id. at 145, because a civil union scheme
confers rights and benefits to lesbians and gay men and by so doing it "ameliorates rather than
ratifies a sexuality caste system." Id. at 140.
86 See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
87 Brief of Interested Party/Amicus Curiae, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, at
4-5, In re Request for an Advisory Opinion from the President of the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565
(Mass. 2004) (No. 09163) [hereinafter Brief of Interested Party].
88 Id. at 12-15.
89 Id. at 14.
90 See id.
91 Id. at 27.
20061 1503
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1493
because that is the institution which society already recognizes and respects.92 If the
state were allowed to withhold the word "marriage" from the plaintiffs, it would leave
them with the burden of having to explain and defend continuously the legitimacy of
their relationships.93
The brief added, in language reminiscent of the NAACP's brief in Brown H,94
that "[t]he constitutional commands of equality and liberty brook no compromise." 95
The plaintiffs' lawyers contended that the proposed civil union bill created a two-
tiered approach that was no different from that which the Supreme Court struck down
in Brown J.96 A regime of separate but equal benefits creates and reinforces a caste
system grounded in the notion of second-class citizenship. 97 Such a "perversion of
equality," the brief concluded, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Brown I and
should be rejected in the follow-up to Goodridge.98
In the end, the Massachusetts court agreed entirely with GLAD's arguments. It
held that there was no rational basis for "[s]egregating same-sex unions"99 into a
separate institution and for assigning them "to second-class status."'" The effect of
the proposed bill, the court added, would be to maintain and foster a regime of
exclusion, and as such, it constituted the same type of invidious discrimination that
Goodridge had prohibited.01 The court made clear that the constitutional infirmities
found in Goodridge could be remedied only by affording lesbian and gay couples the
opportunity to marry."
92 Id. at 28.
93 See id. at 35. The brief expressed a particular concern with the response by private
parties, such as insurance companies, to membership in institutions other than marriage. It
noted that "because marriage ties into an existing vocabulary and is already understood, it
is simply common sense that a life insurer faced with a married couple - including a same-
sex married couple - is more likely to extend the married rates to that couple than to a
couple joined in civil union." Id.
The brief also emphasized the inequality in portability of civil unions when compared
to marriages. See id. at 28-32. It pointed to the experience of couples civilly unionized in
Vermont who have had a difficult time getting other jurisdictions to recognize their unions.
See id. at 29-30. Although the brief acknowledged that the majority of jurisdictions have
enacted laws making it clear that they will not recognize same-sex marriages from within or
without those jurisdictions, Massachusetts nonetheless had a "duty as a sovereign to provide
the full measure of equality that it may to its citizens." Id. at 31 (citing Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)).
9 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
9 Brief of Interested Party, supra note 87, at 36 (footnote omitted).
96 Id. at 36-40.
97 Id. at 41.
9' Id. (footnote omitted).
99 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004).
100 Id. at 570.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 570-71.
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Despite the fact that both the president and the governor were expressing deep
misgivings about same-sex marriages, °3 that the state legislature was considering
a constitutional amendment that would ban those marriages, '4 and that opinion polls
showed that most Americans were opposed to gay marriage,"°5 GLAD rejected the
gradualist gains offered by the institution of civil unions in favor of continuing to de-
mand immediate and full marital equality. There is much to GLAD's decision that
harkens back to the debates within the NAACP after Brown I about whether attitudes
must be changed before the law seeks to change behavior.1°6 The GLAD lawyers in
effect asked the Massachusetts court to provide the moral backbone necessary to show
citizens in the state and across the country that constitutional principles "brook no
compromise.""
Although Massachusetts began to issue marriage licenses three months after the
supreme court's advisory opinion, by the end of the year, voters in thirteen states, by
commanding majorities, approved state constitutional amendments that banned same-
sex marriage. 8 The high water mark for gay rights in 2004, as represented by the
issuance of legally valid marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Massachusetts, in
other words, was soon followed by a severe and harmful backlash across the country.
It is necessary to explore the causes and effects of that backlash in order to assess
whether the gains for lesbians and gay men arising from Goodridge and the subse-
quent advisory opinion outweigh the costs associated with the backlash that followed.
In order to better understand the backlash that Goodridge provoked, I explore in the
next section similarities between it and the backlash that followed Brown.
II. THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO BROWN AND GOODRIDGE
Brown H and the Massachusetts Supreme Court's advisory opinion sought to
address the remedial questions left open by Brown I and Goodridge respectively.
The former opinions did not, of course, lead critics of the two courts to cease their
103 See supra notes 64, 69 and accompanying text.
104 See Raphael Lewis, Gay Marriage Foes Push Amendment, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8,
2004, at B 1. The legislature eventually approved a state constitutional amendment that would
ban same-sex marriages and create civil unions. See Pam Belluck, Setback Is Dealt to Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 30, 2004, at Al. The amendment, however, could not take effect
until it was approved by the legislature in the following legislative session and then by voters.
See id. (The legislature resoundingly rejected the amendment when it came up for a second vote
in 2005. See infra note 275 and accompanying text). For a detailed discussion of the consti-
tutional conventions held by the Massachusetts legislature in early 2004, see Bonauto, supra
note 25, at 49-55.
105 See Leonard, supra note 67, at A12 (reporting on a national poll finding that fifty-nine
percent of respondents opposed same-sex marriage); Seelye & Elder, supra note 68 (report-
ing on a national poll finding that sixty-one percent of respondents opposed same-sex marriage).
'06 See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
107 Brief of Interested Party, supra note 87, at 36 (footnote omitted).
108 See infra notes 165-83 and accompanying text.
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political and legal efforts to undermine the latter decisions. This section of the article
summarizes the post-Brown and post-Goodridge backlashes and emphasizes important
similarities between the two.
A. Political and Legal Responses Following Brown II
Although the Court in Brown II did not call for the immediate desegregation of
public schools as the plaintiffs requested, Marshall and others at the NAACP ini-
tially remained optimistic that meaningful desegregation of public schools in the
South would soon begin." They were, however, quickly and deeply disappointed
as the resistance by southern states to court-mandated desegregation only strength-
ened in the months and years to come.
The objections to Brown on the part of many white southerners were two-fold.
First, the opinion was highly resented as a form of federal interference with state
and local affairs." 0 The federal government, this time represented by the Supreme
Court, was once again seen as improperly meddling in the affairs of the South, a
type of resentment, of course, with a long history going back to the Civil War."'
Second, Brown addressed an issue of great sensitivity for many white southerners.
The apartheid society that still existed in the South in the 1950s was built on the
idea that blacks were inherently inferior to whites. 2 The system of segregated public
education was a cornerstone of white supremacist ideology in the South. 3 It was one
thing, for example, for federal courts to require whites to share train compartments
with blacks;" it was quite another for them to tell white parents that their children
had to attend school with black children." 5 Segregationists correctly realized that a
regime built on the notion of white supremacy was unlikely to survive if black
children had enforceable constitutional rights to attend schools with white children. , 6
The Supreme Court's failure in Brown II to order the immediate desegregation of
public schools, or even to set a precise timetable for such, was interpreted by many in
the South as a sign of weakness. "17 Rather than mollifying southern white conser-
vatives, Brown II had the opposite effect. Resistance efforts, which were already
09 See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 749-50; PATERSON, supra note 22, at 84-85.
"O Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, for example, contended that the decision was "'the
most serious blow that has yet been struck against the rights of the states in a matter vitally
affecting their authority and welfare."' KLUGER, supra note 22, at 713.
"'. See ROBERT J. CoTTROL ET AL., BROwN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE,
AND THE CONSTrUTION 211 (2003).
112 See id.
113 See PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 11-12.
"' See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
115 See PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 88 (discussing the "uniquely sensitive place" of
schools in provoking racial tensions).
116 See id.
117 See KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 390 ("Brown H fueled further resistance, as many
southern whites detected weakness in the justices' efforts to be conciliatory.").
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under way after Brown I, only intensified after Brown I. Grass-roots organizations
such as Citizens' Councils, which "were committed to preserving white supremacy
by all means short of violence," mushroomed throughout the South." 8 Even more
problematically, the late 1950s saw a resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan as a growing
number of southern whites came to see violence and intimidation as necessary means
to preserve their lifestyle." 9
The strong opposition to Brown by segregationists soon had its effects on elec-
toral politics. Although virtually all Southern politicians who were in office at the
time Brown was decided were segregationist, many were, by the standards of the
time, racial moderates who had not overtly opposed pre-Brown efforts to implement
gradual racial reforms in areas such as voting rights and public transportation. 20
Several of these moderate politicians had run for office on a platform of economic
populism, calling for increased government spending on matters such as education,
roads, and public health.'' These officials, such as Governors Jim Folsom of Alabama
and Orval Faubus of Arkansas, enjoyed the support of broad coalitions of working
class whites and blacks who found the message of economic populism and govern-
mental largesse appealing.'
White moderate politicians in the South, however, became an endangered species
in the second half of the 1950s. The response to Brown among the white populace
was so intensely negative that it became practically impossible for politicians to be
elected or re-elected unless they were uncompromising in their support for segrega-
tion. Some, like Governor Folsom, were defeated in the next election because of their
moderation. 123 Others, like Govemor Faubus, transformed themselves into dogmatic
supporters of segregation, assuring themselves reelection for years to come. 124 A
candidate's ability to succeed electorally in the South following Brown depended on
his willingness to make sure that there was no other candidate to his right on the issue
of segregation. 25 This charged political environment left little room for moderation
or compromise. 121
11 Id. The first Citizens' Council was formed two months after Brown. PATTERSON, supra
note 22, at 96. See generally NEIL R. MCMIL.LEN, THE CrI1ZENS' COUNCIL: ORGANIZED REsIs-
TANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-64 (1971) (providing a detailed exploration
of the role of Citizens' Councils in the southern resistance to desegregation).
"' See KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 392.
120 See id. at 385-86.
121 See id. at 386.
122 See id. at 386, 394.
123 See id. at 396-97.
124 See id. at 394-99.
'2 See id. The early political career of George Wallace is perhaps the best known example
of this phenomenon. When Wallace first ran for governor in Alabama in 1958, he was perceived
as being "soft" in his commitment to segregation. See id. at 399. Wallace learned his lesson and
returned four years later easily winning the election after selling himself as the most committed
segregationist of all the candidates. See id. at 406.
126 j. HARViE WILKNSON Ill, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 73-74 (1979); see also Matthew D. Lassiter & Andrew B. Lewis,
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The federal government, for its part, was hesitant and timid in its response to
Brown. President Dwight Eisenhower refused to support Brown in public and was
quite critical of the opinion in private. 127 Congress enacted a civil rights statute in
1957, the first since the Reconstruction, 2' but its scope was limited and had no impact
on the pace of school desegregation in the South. 2 9 With the exception of President
Eisenhower's decision to send federal troops to restore order in Little Rock in 1957
after that city descended into violent chaos when school officials made a modest
effort to desegregate one school, 130 the federal government in the 1950s remained
a bystander observing from the sidelines. 31 In fact, the most vocal federal officials
on the issue of school segregation were Southern congressmen. Almost 100 of them
signed a proclamation issued in 1956, called the Southern Manifesto, which criticized
the Supreme Court for a "clear abuse ofjudicial power" and called on "all lawful means
to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution. "132
Brown not only galvanized white conservatives and radicalized Southern politics,
it also provoked specific legal responses by southern states as they sought to change
their laws to obstruct the desegregation of schools. One of the favored legal responses
to Brown in the 1950s - as it was to Goodridge in 2004133 - was to amend state
constitutions. In 1954, for example, Louisiana added a provision to its constitution
stating that "[a]ll public elementary and secondary schools.., shall be operated
separately for white and colored children. 1 34 The provision added that the amend-
ment was not adopted "because of race"; instead the goal was supposedly to protect
the health and morals of the public, as well as to promote the proper education of
children. 135 For their part, Arkansas voters approved a constitutional amendment
Introduction to THE MODERATES' DILEMMA: MASSIVE RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION IN VIRGINIA 1, 3 (Matthew D. Lassiter & Andrew B. Lewis eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE
MODERATES' DLEMMA] ("In the aftermath of Brown, the charged political climate surrounding
issues of race and education muffled the voices of many who dissented from the defiant course
chosen by the region's political leaders."). For a discussion of the inability of southern liberals
and moderates to counteract the massive resistance to Brown offered by committed segrega-
tionists, see Tony Badger, Fatalism, Not Gradualism: The Crisis of Southern Liberalism,
1945-65, in THE MAKING OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE CIvIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 67,
80-88 (Brian Ward & Tony Badger eds., 1996).
127 See KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 324-25; PATITERSON, supra note 22, at 80-82.
128 See KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 366.
129 See id. A provision that would have given the U.S. attorney general the authority to
bring desegregation suits was removed at the last moment with President Eisenhower's
support. See id. at 325. The final bill enacted into law "covered only voting rights, and even
that it did ineffectively." Id.
131 See PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 109-11.
13' See KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 324-25.
132 PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 98.
133 See infra notes 165-83 and accompanying text.
134 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 239 (1956) (quoting LA. CONST. art. XII, § 1).
135 Id. Louisiana also enacted a statute in 1956 suspending compulsory education in school
systems that were under a court order to desegregate. Id. at 728 (citing LA. REV. STAT. tit. 17,
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in 1956 requiring the legislature to interpose state sovereignty by doing everything
within its power to nullify Brown.
13 6
Alabama also amended its constitution in 1956 by making it clear (1) that there
was no right to a public education and (2) that the legislature had the authority to
enact laws that would allow parents to have their children "attend schools provided
for their own race."' 3 7 The former provision was intended to allow school districts
the opportunity to close down altogether rather than to integrate, an option pursued
by some localities in the South 3' until the Supreme Court put an end to the practice
in 1964.139 The latter section was a constitutional codification of a policy pursued
by all southern states after Brown through what became known as "freedom of choice"
laws. These laws gave parents, rather than government officials, the ability to deter-
mine which schools their children attended.'" They sought, in other words, to replace
a system of de jure segregation with one of de facto segregation. Supporters of the
laws knew that the vast majority of white parents would choose to keep their children
in white schools, while a significant number of black parents would choose to pro-
tect their children from intimidation and violence by keeping them in black schools. '4'
South Carolina took a different constitutional tack. That state in 1952, pre-
sumably under the expectation that it would eventually be required by the federal
courts to desegregate its schools, repealed a constitutional provision that required
the legislature to "provide for a liberal system of free public schools for all children
between the ages of six and twenty-one.' ' 4 2 In its place, the legislature enacted a
§ 221 (1950). Other southern states enacted similar laws: Arkansas, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 453
(1957), Florida, 4 RACEREL. L. REP. 753 (1959), Mississippi, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 422 (1956).
136 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 1116 (1956) (citing ARK. CONST. amend. 47). The legislatures of
six other southern states issued similar "interposition and nullification" resolutions: Alabama,
1 RACE REL. L. REP. 437 (1956), Florida, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 707 (1957), Louisiana, 1 RACE
REL. L. REP. 753 (1956), Mississippi, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 440 (1956), South Carolina, 1 RACE
REL. L. REP. 443 (1956), and Virginia, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 445 (1956).
117 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 418 (1956) (quoting ALA. CONST. § 256). The state senator who
proposed the amendment stated at the time that "[i]t gives sufficient authority to the Legislature
to authorize school boards of education to vary their educational plans when necessary to avoid
integration." Taylor Bright, Language Stems from 1956 Session, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD,
Nov. 27, 2004, at 1. It is telling of the charged racial politics of the time that only one Alabama
legislator voted against the amendment. See id. Interestingly, on November 2, 2004, the same
day in which voters in eleven states across the country voted to amend their constitutions to
prohibit same-sex marriages, see infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text, Alabama voters
rejected an effort to repeal the segregationist language contained in their constitution. See
Manuel Roig-Franzia, Defeat of ConstitutionalAmendment, NEWSDAY, Nov. 29, 2004, at A23.
138 See WILKINSON, supra note 126, at 82-83.
139 Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
140 See PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 100-01.
141 See id. The Supreme Court did not strike down the "freedom of choice" laws until
fourteen years after Brown. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
142 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 241 n.a (1956).
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statute in 1955 that withheld state funds from school districts that were under a court
order to transfer students from one school to another. 14
3
In addition to closing down schools, implementing freedom to choose laws, and
cutting off funding for schools under desegregation orders, other legal responses to
Brown included the enactment of pupil placement laws and the adoption of so-
called grade-a-year plans that sought to desegregate school systems one grade at a
time, starting with either the first or the twelfth grade. The purpose of the pupil place-
ment laws was to use ostensibly neutral criteria, such as aptitude, psychological
fitness, and health, to make school assignment decisions that left racial segregation
firmly in place.'" The purpose of the grade-a-year plans was to make sure that no
school system was fully desegregated in less than twelve years. 141
The radicalization of southern politics, and the related state constitutional and
statutory responses to Brown, were for years quite effective in preventing any mean-
ingful desegregation. In fact, as already noted, by 1964, a full decade after Brown,
only one percent of black children in the South were attending school with white
children. "
141 See id. at 241. In Virginia, a commission appointed by the Governor, known as the Gray
commission, suggested in 1955 replacing the provision in the state constitution that called for
racially segregated schools with amendments calling for a pupil placement plan and authorizing
the use of state funds to pay for the education of white students whose parents preferred that
they attend private schools rather than desegregated public schools. See Lassiter & Lewis,
Introduction to THE MODERATES' DILEMMA, supra note 126, at 6. (For an explanation of pupil
placement laws, see infra note 144 and accompanying text). Two-thirds of the Virginia voters
approved a constitutional convention to implement the commission's proposals. See Lassiter
& Lewis, supra, at 6. In the end, however, the legislature chose to enact "a package of 'massive
resistance laws,' including [a pupil placement law], a provision to cut off state funding to any
school system which desegregated, a measure empowering the governor to close any public
school facing court-ordered desegregation, and a series of laws designed to intimidate and
obstruct the NAACP." Id. at 7.
1" For a discussion of pupil placement laws, which were adopted by every southern state,
see KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 329-31,358-59; PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 100. In 1958,
the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the denial of a facial challenge to a pupil placement law.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
145 See PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 108. The Sixth Circuit in 1959 upheld Nashville's
grade-a-year plan, which included a so-called minority-to-majority transfer option that allowed
students who attended schools in which their racial group was a minority to request a transfer.
Kelley v. Bd. of Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959). "This [scheme] ensured that no whites
would be compelled to attend a majority-black school and encouraged blacks, through a
variety of formal and informal pressures, to transfer out of racially mixed schools to which
they had been assigned." KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 331. The Supreme Court, over the ob-
jection of Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Douglas, refused to review
Kelley. 361 U.S. 924 (1959).
'46 See supra text accompanying note 63.
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B. Political and Legal Responses to Goodridge
The most recent backlash against same-sex marriage began in the summer of
2003, six months before Goodridge was decided.'47 It was then that the Supreme
Court in Lawrence v. Texas held that the criminalization of consensual sodomy is un-
constitutional.'48 Many conservatives were outspokenly critical of the opinion, in
part, because they perceived it as setting the stage for the eventual striking down of
bans against same-sex marriage. 49 The clamor raised by conservative critics follow-
ing Lawrence seemed to have an impact on public opinion. A poll taken a month
after the decision was issued found that only forty-eight percent of respondents
thought that same-sex relations between consenting adults should be legal, down
from sixty percent three months earlier. 5°
Six months after Lawrence, the Massachusetts Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Goodridge. The response by social conservatives to Goodridge was immediate and
forceful as they criticized the court for its purported judicial activism and its disregard
for traditional values. 5' Conservative groups reached out to supporters with a sense
of urgency and determination because, as they saw it, the institution of marriage was
in great peril.'52 These groups were quite successful in encouraging scores of conser-
vatives across the nation to organize and become politically involved on the issue of
marriage.
153
147 I say most recent because there were earlier backlashes. In the 1990s, after the Supreme
Court of Hawaii issued its opinion in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), Congress
enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2005) (defining marriage as "a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife"). Many states followed
Congress's lead by enacting their own so-called mini-DOMAs. See infra notes 243-44 and
accompanying text.
148 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
149 Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, § 5
(Magazine), at 48. Senator Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) stated two months before Lawrence was
issued that "'[i]f the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual sex within
your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right
to adultery."' Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Persistent Conflict for Gays and G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2003, at A20. The Senator added that "'[i]n every society, the definition of marriage
has not to my knowledge included homosexuality.... That's not to pick on homosexuality.
[Marriage is] not, you know, man on child, man on dog, or whatever the case may be."' Id.
1"0 Susan Page, Americans Less Tolerant on Gay Issues, USATODAY, July 29, 2003, at IA.
Polls taken after Lawrence also showed a drop in support for civil unions for lesbians and gay
men from "49 percent in May to 37 percent in August." Rosen, supra note 149, at 48. These
numbers have since changed, however, with a majority of Americans now supporting civil
unions for lesbians and gay men. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
152 See Seelye, supra note 66, at A29.
'53 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush's Plans for Marriage Falls Short for Conservatives,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at A18.
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Conservative groups, in the weeks that followed the issuance of Goodridge,
pursued a two-part strategy. The first, as already noted, was to push for a federal con-
stitutional amendment that would take away from the states the power to recognize
same-sex marriage.'54 The second was to focus on the state level by pressing for
state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage.'55
The political mobilization on the part of social conservatives soon began to bear
fruit. In January 2004, two months after Goodridge, the Ohio legislature enacted a
broad-ranging statute that not only made Ohio the thirty-eighth state with a so-called
mini-Defense of Marriage Act that banned the recognition of same-sex marriage, but
also prohibited the state from providing domestic partnership benefits to its em-
ployees.'56 In the same month, President Bush, under strong pressure from conserva-
tives, said in his State of the Union message that he would resort to the "constitutional
process" if necessary in order to defend the "sanctity" of marriage.' 57 For his part, San
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, apparently responding to the president's speech,
ordered that marriage licenses be issued to same-sex couples.'58 During the following
four weeks, San Francisco issued more than four thousand such licenses before a court
ordered it to cease. 159
The sight of lesbian and gay couples receiving marriage licenses in San Francisco
further angered social conservatives across the country.' 6 They increased the pressure
"5 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
151 James Dao, State Action Is Pursued on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2004, at A24; Mary Leonard, SJC Ruling Aftermath: Mass. Rulings Push States to Seek a
Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2004, at Al.
156 See Legislative Notes, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater
N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2004, at 27. Two months later, both chambers of the Virginia
Legislature, by commanding majorities, approved an amendment to the state's mini-DOMA
that prohibited civil unions or other arrangements "purporting to bestow the privileges and
obligations of marriage." Marriage & Partnership Legislative Notes, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES
(Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2004, at 58.
15' Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Ban on Gay Marriages Leads List of Proposals, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A17.
58 Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Mayor Exults in Move on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2004, at A14.
"9 Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Forced to Halt Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2004, at Al; Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Married 4,037 Same-Sex Pairs from 46 States,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at A26. The California Supreme Court later held that the city
inappropriately issued the licenses and that they had no legal validity. See Lockyer v. City &
County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). Other municipalities, such as New Paltz, New York,
and Portland, Oregon, also issued marriage licenses to lesbian and gay couples for a brief period
in early 2004. See Sabrina Tavemise and Thomas Crampton, Gay Couples to Be Wed Today
in New Paltz, Mayor Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at B5; Matthew Preusch, Oregon
County, with Portland, Offers Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A26.
'6o Ralph Z. Hallow, Evangelicals Frustrated by Bush, Threaten to Stay Homefor Election,
WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2004, at Al.
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on the president to articulate, in unequivocal terms, his support for a federal consti-
tutional amendment prohibiting states from recognizing same-sex marriages.' 6 ' The
president heeded to their requests, announcing, at a White House briefing in February
2004, that he was calling on Congress to approve the amendment. 162 It was widely
understood at the time that the president needed to endorse the amendment in order
to retain the strong support of his political base. 163 Without that support, his prospects
for reelection were diminished."6
State legislatures soonjoined the fracas. The Arizona House Judiciary Committee
and the Virginia House of Representatives called on Congress to approve the federal
constitutional amendment. 65 The legislatures in Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, and Utah 6" approved constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex
marriage and ordered that the issue be put before voters in the upcoming November
election. In the meantime, conservative activists were busy in other states canvass-
ing the electorate. Sufficient signatures were gathered in Arkansas, 167 Michigan,
168
Montana,1 69 North Dakota, 170 Ohio, 171 and Oregon'72 to put constitutional amend-
ments banning same-sex marriage on the November ballots. 173
It is important to note that the majority of the proposed constitutional amend-
ments not only called for the prohibition of same-sex marriages, but also for the
banning of alternative means through which the state might provide same-sex
161 Id.; see also David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives Using Issue of Gay Unions as a
Rallying Tool, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2004, at 1; Mary Leonard, Pace Quickens on Push for
an Amendment, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2004, at A2.
162 Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2004, at Al.
163 Robin Toner, Keeping Faith with His Base, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al.
164 Id.
165 See Same-Sex Marriage: Other Political and Legal Developments, LESBIAN/GAY L.
NOTES (Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2004, at 36-37.
'66 See Marriage & Partner Recognition Legislative Notes, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian
& Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), May 2004, at 87.
167 Marriage & Partnership Legislative Notes, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian & Gay
Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Summer 2004, at 134.
168 See id.
'69 See James Dao, Renewed State Efforts Made Against Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2004, at A17.
170 See id.
171 See Notes on Anti-Marriage Constitutional Amendment Developments, LESBIAN/GAY
L. NOTES (Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2004, at 197.
172 See Marriage & Partnership Legislative Notes, supra note 167, at 135.
17' Local officials also got into the act. The district attorney for Ulster County in New
York, for example, filed misdemeanor charges against two ministers for performing civil
marriages for same-sex couples. See Thomas Crampton, Two Ministers Are Charged in Gay
Nuptials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,2004, at B 1. The charges were eventually dismissed by a trial
judge. See Debra West, New Paltz: Gay-Marriage Charges Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2004, at B5.
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couples with some or all of the rights and benefits that it traditionally assigns through
the institution of marriage. Thus, for example, the North Dakota amendment, in
addition to defining marriage as "the legal union between a man and a woman," also
stated that "[n]o other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as
a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect."' 4 The Oklahoma
provision stated that "[n]either this Constitution nor any other provision of law shall
be construed to require that marital status or legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups." 175
As the months progressed, it appeared that the same-sex marriage issue was going
to play an important role in the upcoming elections. In Missouri, for example, the
legislature approved placing that state's constitutional amendment relating to marriage
before voters, 76 but a disagreement broke out between Republicans and Democrats
as to when the vote should take place. Republicans, hoping that the issue would help
their candidates at the ballot box, wanted the amendment voted on during the general
election in November. 77 The Democrats preferred that the vote be held during the
August primary. 178 Even though the Democrats prevailed, the amendment was ap-
proved by a commanding seventy percent of voters. 179 A few weeks later, almost
eighty percent of voters in Louisiana approved that state's constitutional amendment.'
80
The same-sex marriage issue continued to energize social and religious conser-
vative groups throughout the fall of 2004, helping them with grass-roots organizing
and voter registration.' 8' On election day, voters in all eleven states that had consti-
tutional provisions on the ballot related to same-sex marriage approved them by
large majorities. 82 This was the case not only in conservative states, such as Utah
174 N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (2005).
171 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35(A) (2004). Another provision makes it a misdemeanor for
"[a]ny person knowingly issuing a marriage license in violation of this section." Id. § 35(C).
176 Marriage & Partner Recognition Legislative Notes, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian
& Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), May 2004, at 86.
"' See Same-Sex Marriage & Partnership Legislative Notes, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES
(Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2004, at 164.
178 See id.
'9 See Monica Davey, Missourians Back Amendment Barring Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2004, at A13.
180 See Gay-Marriage Ban Passes in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, § 1, at 24.
181 The Republican National Committee, a month before the election, "blanketed Ohio with
direct mail that screamed 'Traditional Values Are Under Attack From the Radical Left,' and
urged that 'one vote' could 'protect marriage."' Sarah Wildman, Wedding-Bell Blues, AM.
PROSPECT, Dec. 2004, at 39. Karl Rove, President Bush's chief political strategist, "made the
11 marriage amendments a cornerstone of his get-out-the-evangelical-vote campaign, enlisting
the help of prominent Republicans and national Christian organizations." Id. Conservative
groups organized rallies in support of traditional marriage in states such as Mississippi and
North Carolina that were attended by thousands of supporters. See id.
182 See Cheryl Wetzstein, Eleven States Uphold Traditional Marriage, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2004, at Al.
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and Mississippi, but also in more liberal ones, such as Oregon. 3 Furthermore, the
conventional wisdom immediately after the election was that issues of values and
morality in general, and same-sex marriage in particular, played an important role in
the presidential race, especially in Ohio, the state that ended up deciding the election.'
14
There are interesting parallels, therefore, between the post-Brown and post-
Goodridge periods. Then, as now, a judicial opinion that promoted civil rights galva-
nized social conservatives prompting them to mobilize politically. 5 Then, as now,
state constitutions were amended and laws were enacted that reflected the growing
displeasure among many citizens with court-mandated equality.'86 And then, as now,
some elected officials did their best to stoke that displeasure by criticizing judges as ir-
responsible for issuing judicial opinions that were out of step with majoritarian views.'87
Despite the similarities in the responses to Brown and Goodridge, it is necessary
to acknowledge important differences. The backlash in the 1950s and early 1960s was
not only political and legal; it was also violent. During that period, Southern blacks
(and some of their white supporters) were subjected to violence, intimidation, and
harassment at the hands of segregationists. 88 Although lesbians and gay men, as well
as bisexuals and transgendered individuals, are today among the most likely to be the
victims of hate crimes, 8 9 that violence is not politically organized and coordinated as
it was in the South five decades ago.
183 See id.
4 See, e.g., James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some GOP Races, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2004, at P4 (reporting that political analysts stated that the "constitutional amend-
ments banning same-sex marriage increased the turnout of socially conservative voters in
many of the 11 states where the measures appeared on the ballot ... providing crucial
assistance to Republican candidates including President Bush in Ohio and Senator Jim
Bunning in Kentucky."); Notebook, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 15, 2004, at 10 (suggesting that
"gay marriage may have been instrumental in tipping the balance to Bush, particularly with
so many Bush voters citing his moral qualities as a reason to support him."); Paul Starr,
Morals of the Election, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2004, at 4 (arguing that "the reaction against
gay marriage has triggered a huge evangelical turnout, probably tipping Ohio and thus the
Electoral College."); David Usborne, Moral Issues at the Heart of the Vote, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 4, 2004, at B9 (arguing that moral issues decided the election). The
conventional wisdom, however, was later questioned by some. See, e.g., Pam Beluck, Maybe
Same-Sex Marriage Didn't Make the Difference, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 2004, § 4, at 3; Kenneth
Sherrill, Did Same-Sex Marriage Doom Kerry?, GAY &LESBIAN REv. WORLDWIDE, Jan. 2005,
at 14.
185 See supra notes 120-26, 151-56 and accompanying text.
186 See supra notes 134-43, 174-84 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 65-66, 124-26, 132 and accompanying text.
188 See PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 87; KLARmAN, supra note 24, at 431-41.
189 See William B. Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S. Hate Crimes Statistics: An Empirical
Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1213 (2004).
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Another important difference between the civil rights era of the 1950s and the
contemporary struggle for gay rights is the level of oppression. For all of the dis-
crimination experienced today by lesbians and gay men, they do not live under an
apartheid regime such as the one that existed in many parts of the United States well
into the second half of the twentieth century.190
Despite these important differences, the similarities in the responses to Brown and
Goodridge relating to the political galvanization of conservatives, as well as to the
approval of state constitutional and statutory changes aimed at impeding civil rights
advancements, is striking. The similarities, in fact, raise important questions about the
backlash that frequently follows highly controversial judicial opinions that side with
civil rights proponents. In the next section, I explore what has become known as the
Brown backlash thesis, which holds that the opinion was, at least in the short run,
counterproductive from a civil rights perspective because of the backlash that it pro-
voked. Interestingly, similar arguments have been made about Goodridge.
III. THE BACKLASH THESIS
Brown is for many an iconic opinion that is like no other in the history of the
nation.' 9 The conventional wisdom is that Brown played a crucial role in fostering
the civil rights movement, dismantling Jim Crow laws, and changing American society
forever. 92 Some, however, have questioned this widely accepted understanding of
Brown's impact by arguing that the opinion initially was relatively insignificant in
ending segregation in the South, and that it was actually counterproductive in the
190 For a summary of that regime, see Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context:
In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REv. 973, 1018-27 (2005) (reviewing KLARMAN, supra
note 24).
191 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education: A Critical Introduction, in
WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3,4 (Jack M. Balkin ed.,
2001) (arguing that "there is no doubt that [Brown] is the single most honored opinion in the
Supreme Court's corpus."); see also KLUGER, supra note 22, at 713 (arguing that Brown
"represented nothing short of a reconsecration of American ideals"); WILKINSON, supra note
126, at 6 ("Brown may be the most important political, social, and legal event in America's
twentieth-century history.").
"9 See, e.g., COTrROL ET AL., supra note 111, at 8 (describing Brown as having "played
a pivotal role in the postwar civil rights movement in the United States ..... a movement that
would ultimately bring about far-reaching change in American race relations"); KLUGER,
supra note 22, at 754 (arguing that Brown "spawned" the civil rights movement); WILLIAM
LASSER, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POwER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLmCS
162-63 (1988) (noting that "[t]he importance of Brown I was clear from the start .... Brown
led not only to the transformation of Southem society but to major changes in Northern
society as well."); Finkelman, supra note 190, at 1018 (arguing that "it is impossible to imagine
the civil rights revolution having succeeded so quickly in sweeping away de jure segregation
without Brown.").
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struggle for civil rights because of the backlash that it engendered. This perspective
has become known as the Brown backlash thesis. Its most prominent proponent is
Professor Michael Klarman, who defends the thesis in great detail in his recent book
From Jim Crow to Civil Rights.
193
Klarman begins his argument by suggesting that by the time Brown was decided,
most parts of the country other than the South had made significant progress in the
desegregation of public schools. De jure desegregation, for example, had ended in
northern states, such as New Jersey and Illinois, by the early 1950s, while several
western states, such as Arizona and New Mexico, had begun to desegregate before
Brown.'94 Klarman also suggests that border states like Delaware, Maryland, West
Virginia, and Missouri "might have followed similar paths and desegregated without
Court intervention."1 95
The first part of Klarman's argument, then, is that desegregation was possible in
most of the country in the absence of a constitutional mandate issued by the Supreme
Court. Klarman then proceeds to question the conventional wisdom that Brown
played an indispensable role in educating white Americans about the evils of racial
segregation.' 96 Klarman notes that the opinion played no such role in the South,
where most whites felt disdain for the Court, the Brown opinion, and the idea that
the Constitution required the racial desegregation of schools.' 97 Klarman also argues
that social and economic forces, as well as the lingering revulsion toward Nazi
policies, played a greater role in moving public opinion in the North toward greater
egalitarianism in racial matters than did Brown.98 As he puts it, "Brown may have
had a marginal impact on those who were undecided and thus most susceptible to
the Court's influence, but it did not fundamentally transform the racial attitudes of
most Americans." 199
113 See generally KLARMAN, supra note 24. Gerald Rosenberg also argues "that while
there is little evidence that Brown helped produce positive change, there is some evidence
that it hardened resistance to civil rights among both elites and the white public." GERALD
N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 155
(1991). He adds that "[w]hile it must be the case that Court action influenced some people,
I have found no evidence that this influence was widespread or of much importance to the
battle for civil rights." Id. at 156.
A different criticism of Brown holds that African Americans have been poorly served by
the opinion's integrationist approach. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V.
BoARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFI.LED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORMS (2004). The back-
lash thesis does not question the integrationist goal of the opinion; instead, it questions the
opinion's effectiveness in achieving that goal.
'94 See KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 344-45.
id. at 345.
196 Id.
'9' Id. at 367.
'98 Id. at 368.
'99 Id. Klarman points out that an opinion poll taken in 1959 found that five percent more
Americans agreed with Brown than they did in 1954, an increase of only one percent a year. Id.
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Klarman also argues that while Brown encouraged more legal challenges to segre-
gation laws, it did not, as is generally assumed, play an important role in motivating
the direct-action protests that were ultimately responsible for the demise of Jim Crow.
Klarman points out that civil rights protests did not begin in earnest until 1960, weak-
ening the causal connection between Brown and them.2°° He adds that the protests
were the result of social, economic, and political changes such as the migration of
blacks from farms to cities, which made it easier for them to organize politically, as
well as increases in prosperity and educational levels among blacks." 1
In fact, Klarman suggests that Brown may have discouraged direct-action protests
because it encouraged blacks to a rely on litigation rather than on collective action on
the streets.2°2 This may explain the relative paucity of direct-action protests in the late
1950s, as most blacks, under the urging of the NAACP, waited to see what could be
accomplished through the courts. 3 Klarman categorizes the NAACP's focus on liti-
gation after Brown as "myopic" because "the capacity of litigation to transform race
relations was limited."2' Litigation, rather than promoting a sense of agency and self-
determination among blacks, encouraged them to be passive and to wait and see what
white institutions, such as the courts, could offer them.2 5
In the end, Klarman argues, Brown did not lead directly to either the spawning
of the civil rights movement or to the demise of Jim Crow. Instead, the impact of
Brown was primarily indirect: it provoked a massive resistance movement among
southern whites, which led to direct-action protests by blacks, which, in turn, even-
tually ended de jure segregation in the South.
The frustration felt by blacks as a result of the seeming inability of major insti-
tutions, including the courts, to put an end to the massive resistance to Brown led
them to protest in the streets.2" It was, in other words, the backlash among Southern
whites against Brown that resulted in the mobilization of an effective grassroots
movement on behalf of civil rights. White officials in the South, in turn, reacted to
the street protests with a ferocity and violence that finally awakened the dormant
conscience and sense of (in)dignity of the rest of the nation." Pressure for meaningful
200 Id. at 374. Klarman also disputes the view that Brown inspired the Birmingham bus
boycott. Id. at 370-71.
201 Id. at 374-75. Klarman posits that the protests may have begun in 1960 because of the
demise of McCarthyism - which freed civil rights and liberal groups from having to defend
themselves from accusations of a lack of patriotism and of sympathizing with communists
- and of the ongoing decolonization of Africa, which showed black Americans what collective
action could accomplish. Id. at 376.
202 Id. at 377.
203 The NAACP, well into the 1960s, was skeptical of the advisability of direct-action pro-
tests and counseled instead in favor of pursuing litigation. See id. at 377-79.
204 Id. at 379.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 382-84.
207 See id. at 429-42.
1518
THE BACKLASH THESIS AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
reform began to be applied only when whites outside of the South were exposed, pri-
marily through television, to the brutality perpetrated by police officers, as well as by
segregationist thugs, against peaceful civil rights protestors in places like Birmingham,
Alabama and Selma, Mississippi." s It was this pressure that finally led Congress to
become involved by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the first comprehensive
federal civil rights law since the Reconstruction, which, by prohibiting discrimination
in almost every sector of American society, provided the mortal blow to Jim Crow. 209
It was only after Congress, along with officials in the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-
trations, began to make it clear that southern resistance to school desegregation was
no longer acceptable that the Supreme Court, almost ten years after Brown, reentered
the fray by issuing opinions striking down laws and policies aimed at impeding mean-
ingful desegregation.21°
A key component of Klarman's backlash thesis is the notion that Brown radical-
ized white politics in the South.' This radicalization had wide-ranging consequences.
It is possible that, in the absence of the radicalization, desegregation would have pro-
gressed steadily under the guidance of moderate politicians and school officials. 2,2
This might have mollified blacks sufficiently so as to have made direct-action protests
unnecessary. Instead, most Southern whites were so angered by Brown, and were so
implacably opposed to its strictures, that they rejected out of hand any effort to com-
promise. 21 3 This, in turn, left blacks with no choice but to seek change through
protests and demonstrations.1 4
For Klarman, then, the crucial impact of Brown was the backlash that it pro-
voked. That backlash eventually led to the end of de jure segregation because it
forced the rest of the country and the federal government to pay attention to what
was happening in the South. But the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not enacted until
ten long years after Brown was decided, with much violence, anger, recrimination, and
polarization along the way, and with, up until that point, very little actual deseg-
regation of southern schools.2"5 Without Brown, Klarman argues, desegregation
would likely have been both more peaceful and more timely.21 6
208 See id. at 435-41.
21 See id. at 442.
210 See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that closing schools to
maintain racial segregation was unconstitutional); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963)
(striking down a minority-to-majority transfer scheme that allowed students who attended
schools in which their racial group was a minority to request a transfer).
211 KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 389-408.
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 382-84.
25 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
216 KLARMAN, supra note 24, at 441-42.
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The Brown backlash thesis has received significant attention since Klarman first
proposed it more than ten years ago.2 17 There are some commentators who remain
unpersuaded. The historian James Patterson, for example, argues that the thesis over-
estimates the willingness of Southern whites to implement some form of limited
desegregation prior to Brown.21 8 It is likely, Patterson argues, that white intran-
sigence would have continued with or without Brown.219 The legal historian Paul
Finkelman takes issue with Klarman's thesis by arguing that Brown was an indis-
pensable moral force for change and that it "set the stage" for the dismantling of
220segregation.
The purpose of this article is not to argue the merits of the Brown backlash thesis.
Instead, I am interested in whether it makes sense to think of Goodridge in the way
that Klarman thinks of Brown. Although no one has yet articulated a backlash under-
standing of Goodridge that is as rich and complex as Klarman's understanding of
Brown, several gay rights supporters have raised concerns about the dangers asso-
ciated with a backlash to court-mandated equality in the context of marriage that
parallels Klarman's critique of Brown. For example, Bill Eskridge, as already noted,
has called for pragmatism and gradualism in the pursuit of the legal recognition of
lesbian and gay relationships.22' Eskridge is concerned that court-mandated marriage
equality will antagonize gay rights opponents leaving little room for moderation or
dialogue.222 As such, Eskridge argues that the Vermont Supreme Court acted appro-
priately in Baker v. State when it refused to require recognition of same-sex marriage
and instead encouraged the legislature to develop an alternative institution.223 This
type of incremental approach, Eskridge notes, leaves room for conversation and
persuasion, as the public is given the opportunity to adjust its views on the legal and
217 Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
L. REV. 7 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash
Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994).
218 PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 115-16.
219 Id. at 116; see also Dennis J. Hutchinson, Perspectives on Brown, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 43,
44 (2004) (arguing that the claims of the backlash thesis are overstated); John Valery White,
The Activist Insecurity and the Demise of Civil Rights Law, 63 LA. L. REv. 785, 800-01 n.62
(2003) (arguing that the backlash thesis "overlooks the fact that... quite little change was
coming to the South, and that 'moderate' southerners worked affirmatively to preserve segre-
gation in order that 'radical' segregationists would not be inflamed").
220 Finkelman, supra note 190, at 978. Finkelman adds that "while Klarman bemoans the
violence against blacks after Brown, it is easy to imagine a much more violent and lethal civil
rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s if the Court in Brown and its progeny had not been
a stalwart friend and supporter of civil rights." Id. at 976. See also David J. Garrow, "Happy"
Birthday, Brown v. Board of Education? Brown's Fiftieth Anniversary and the New Critics of
Supreme Court Muscularity, 90 VA. L. REv. 693,728 (2004) (criticizing Klarman's "excessive
and disappointing diminution of Brown") (reviewing KLARMAN, supra note 24).
221 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
222 ESKRIDGE, supra note 81, at 152-58.
223 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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moral need to recognize the relationships of lesbians and gay men.224 The alternative
is that courts will move too far ahead of public opinion leading to the "nightmare
scenario" of constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage.225
This type of concern with a backlash to court-mandated marriage equality was
expressed with some frequency after Goodridge was decided. Professor Jeffrey Rosen,
for example, writing in the New Republic a month after Goodridge, stated that "[in
addition to being constitutionally unconvincing, the decision was also politically
naive. 226 Rosen worried that "by presuming to redefine marriage, [Goodridge]
threatens to provoke an unnecessary political backlash. 227
For many, the predictions of a dangerous backlash became true in the November
2004 election. For example, Diane Feinstein, the Democratic senator from California,
concluded after the election that same-sex marriage had come "too much, too fast, too
soon" and that it "served as a rallying point to get conservative people to the polls. 228
A liberal commentator, in providing a post-mortem of the election, argued that "[t]he
gay movement thought it could win from judges what the electorate overwhelmingly
opposes. In a decision that was bad law and worse politics, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court set the issue in motion. 2 29 Another noted that "[elven supporters of
224 As Eskridge puts it:
A process that forces minority rights onto an unwilling populace will
often not "stick" in a democracy; a process that is incremental and per-
suades the people or their representatives of the acceptability or even
desirability of minority rights is much more likely to stick. The incre-
mental process will take a lot longer, but it will also be more lasting.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 81, at 148. See also Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Civil Union Statutes:
A Shortcut to Legal Equality for Same-Sex Partners in a Landscape Littered with Defense
of Marriage Acts, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 229, 230 (2004) (arguing that "proponents
of same-sex marriage need to consider the possibility that the title 'marriage' is too hotly
protected. Perhaps winning the rights that married couples get without winning the title is
the best that can be done.").
225 ESKRIDGE, supra note 81, at 150. Eskridge's book was published after Hawaii and Alaska
amended their constitutions in response to judicial opinions favorable to same-sex marriage but
before the slew of constitutional amendments that followed Goodridge.
226 Jeffery Rosen, Immodest Proposal: Massachusetts Gets It Wrong on Gay Marriage,
NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 19.
227 id.
228 Editorial, Gay Marriage Backlash, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 8, 2004, at 24. See also
Mitchell Katine, Introduction to Out of the Closet and into the Light: The Legal Issues of
Sexual Orientation, 24 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 5, 9 (2005) ("Had the Lawrence decision
not come out when it did, followed by the Goodridge decision, the Republican Party would
not have been able to take advantage of the opportunity to use gay and lesbian marriages as
a catalyst to further its conservative views on election day.").
229 Starr, supra note 184. See also Paul Starr, Winning Cases, Losing Voters, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2005, at A17 ("As last year's disastrous crusade for gay marriage illustrated, Democrats
cannot allow their constituencies to draw them into political terrain that can't be defended
at election time."). Some commentators also blamed the electoral defeat on the decision by
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the Goodridge ruling should now have second thoughts about the prudence in creat-
ing a right to same-sex marriage by strictly judicial processes at the beginning of a
year-long national election cycle. 2 30 And leaders of the Human Rights Campaign
(HRC) - the largest gay rights advocacy organization in the country - expressed
the concern, shortly after the election, that "aggressively pursuing same-sex marriage
only played into the hand of Republicans and religious conservatives, who skillfully
used the issue this fall to energize their voters."23' As a result, the HRC announced that
in the future it would emphasize incremental steps, such as seeking Social Security
survivor benefits and hospital visitation privileges for same-sex couples, "rather than
reaching for the gold ring of marriage right away. 232
When all of these comments and concerns are pieced together, a backlash under-
standing of Goodridge begins to emerge, one that views the impact of the case, at
least in the short run, as harmful to the interests of lesbians and gay men. From this
perspective, the post-Goodridge events, and in particular the approval of more than
a dozen state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage in 2004 alone,233
with the likelihood that even more will be approved in the near future,3 shows that
the public is not ready for same-sex marriage, especially when it is judicially man-
dated. As a result, it is better to pursue a gradualist or incremental strategy that seeks
limited rights and benefits for lesbian and gay couples in order to get the public ac-
customed to the (at least partial) legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Only
then, it is argued, does it make sense to pursue same-sex marriage through the courts.235
San Francisco to issue marriage licenses several months before the election. See, e.g., John M.
Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at Al (re-
porting that U.S. Representative Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, strongly criticized
Mayor Newsom for allowing the "spectacle weddings" earlier in the year); Alexander Cockbum,
Don't Say We Didn't Warn You, NATION, Nov. 22, 2004, at 9 ("If the Democrats had wanted
to identify a serious saboteur of their chances they should have homed in on Mayor Gavin
Newsom of San Francisco, whose OK to gay marriage saw all those same-sex couples on the
steps of City Hall embracing, on every front page and nightly news in America.").
230 Brian P. Burke, Same-Sex Marriage Affected Election, WORCESTER TELEGRAM &
GAZETrE (Worcester, Mass.), Nov. 8, 2004, at A9.
231 Broder, supra note 229.
232 Id.
233 See supra notes 165-85 and accompanying text.
234 In 2005, voters in Kansas and Texas approved constitutional amendments prohibiting
same-sex marriage by more than a two-thirds majority. See Janet Elliot, Gay Marriage Ban
Put in Texas Constitution, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 9, 2005; Brad Knickerbocker, Ripples
Spread as States Vote on Same-Sex Marriage, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 7, 2005, at 2.
In 2006, constitutional amendments will be before voters in five states (Alabama, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia). See Wyatt Buchanan, San Francisco Same-
Sex Marriage Still a Hot Topic, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2006, at B1.
235 Matt Foreman, the executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,
complained after the 2004 election that "[i]f the movement had been thinking clearly, we
would have had a political and public education strategy that preceded the legal strategy."
Brad Knickerbocker, Political Battles over Gay Marriage Still Spreading, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MoNrrOR, Nov. 29, 2004, at 1.
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The backlash that followed Goodridge has been undeniably harmful to the inter-
ests of lesbians and gay men. In fact, we are currently experiencing what is likely the
strongest backlash against gay rights since the beginning of the gay rights movement.236
In my estimation, however, it would be a mistake for gay rights supporters to take
away from the current backlash the lesson that the pursuit of marriage equality through
the courts was a mistake.237 As I argue in the next section, that strategy has, up until
now, led to greater gains than losses for lesbians and gay men. This is not to say that
there is no need, going forward, to reassess the marriage strategy by, for example,
emphasizing incremental steps and by paying more attention to the legislative and
political arenas and (proportionally) less attention to the courts. But looking backward,
Goodridge and most of the other same-sex marriage cases have produced sufficient
gains for lesbians and gay men to have made their pursuit worthwhile despite the
backlash that they have provoked.23
236 See generally Symposium, The Legislative Backlash to Advances in Rights For Same-
Sex Couples, 40 TULSA L. REv. 371 (2005) (discussing the extent and impact of the current
backlash against gay rights).
237 In a recent article, Professor Klarman compares the backlash that followed Brown to that
which followed Goodridge. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge),
104 MICH. L. REv. 431,452-83 (2005). Klarman is as critical of the timing of Goodridge as
he is of that of Brown. He argues that "[b]y outpacing public opinion on issues of social
reform, such rulings mobilize opponents, undercut moderates, and retard the cause they
purport to advance." Id. at 482. Klarman's article appeared as this article is going to press,
so I cannot here fully address its contents. As I argue in Part IV, however, I believe that the
same-sex marriage cases have, on the whole, advanced rather than retarded gay rights causes.
Klarman argues that cases like Goodridge make compromise positions, such as that repre-
sented by civil unions, "untenable." Id. at 479. I disagree. I believe that civil unions have
become a viable option in some jurisdictions because the same-sex marriage cases have
raised compelling questions about the intrinsic unfairness of denying legal recognition to
same-sex relationships. See infra Part IV.B. I do agree with Klarman when he notes that the
shift in public opinion in favor of marriage or civil unions for same-sex couples "within just
a few years has been truly astonishing." Klarman, supra, at 485 (footnote omitted). It seems
to me, however, that the same-sex marriage cases have contributed in important ways to that
shift. See infra Parts IV.A. and IV.B.
238 There have been exceptions along the way. One such ill-advised lawsuit led to the first
rejection of a constitutional challenge to a ban against same-sex marriage by a state appellate
court since the 1970s. See Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003). Same-sex marriage litigation should be brought only in states where there have already
been significant legislative and judicial victories on gay rights issues. See Bonauto, supra note
25, at 18-21. Arizona is not one of those states.
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IV. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LITIGATION: GAINS HAVE
(So FAR) OUTWEIGHED LOSSES
Although a few same-sex marriage cases were brought in the 1970s,239 it was not
until the Hawaii litigation of the 1990s that the issue first received national attention.
In particular, it was the Hawaii Supreme Court's ruling in Baehr v. Lewin,240 which
held that the ban against same-sex marriage constituted a form of sex classification
that required the state to establish the existence of a compelling interest, that simul-
taneously exhilarated gay rights supporters and angered gay rights opponents across
the country."' In the ten years between Baehr and Goodridge, there were many defeats
for same-sex marriage proponents along the way. During that period, Congress
enacted the Defense of Marriage Act,242 thirty-seven states passed so-called mini-
DOMAs, 243 and four states amended their constitutions to prohibit same-sex
marriages. 2' Furthermore, as elaborated on in Part II, more than a dozen states have
also, since Goodridge, modified their constitutions to ban same-sex marriages.245
The result has been statutory and constitutional codifications that explicitly prohibit
the recognition of same-sex relationships as marital, and that, in some instances, ban
alternative forms of recognition such as civil unions and domestic partnerships.246
It is important not to minimize the harmful effects of this codification. The federal
DOMA makes same-sex couples ineligible for the many federal rights and benefits
afforded to married couples.247 In the nineteen states that currently have constitu-
tional provisions prohibiting same-sex marriage, it will take either judicial inter-
vention (based on the federal Constitution) or a new state constitutional amendment
to nullify the bans. Neither of these scenarios is likely in the short run. Further-
more, the negative effects of the constitutional amendments, especially of those that
ban not only marriage but alternative forms of recognition, is already being felt.
Some Ohio trial judges, for example, have ruled that the state's new constitutional
239 See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
240 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw.1993).
241 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 81, at 26.
242 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
243 For a list of states that have enacted statutes restricting marriage to different-sex couples,
see Phyllis G. Bossin, Same-Sex Unions: The New Civil Rights Struggle or an Assault on
Traditional Marriage?, 40 TULSA L. REV. 381, 381 n.2 (2005).
244 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 25; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29; NEv. CONST.
art. I, § 21.
245 See supra notes 165-85 and accompanying text.
246 See id.
247 See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1997) (listing some of the rights and benefits that
same-sex couples are ineligible to receive under DOMA).
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amendment prohibits the filing of domestic violence charges against unmarried
individuals.248 In Michigan, the state attorney general has opined that the state's new
constitutional provision prohibits public employers from providing domestic partner-
ship benefits to their employees.249
Although it is difficult to quantify with much precision either the backlash-related
costs or the benefits arising from the same-sex marriage litigation, I believe that, on
the whole, the latter have (so far) outweighed the former. In this section of the article,
I explore three important ways in which the gay rights movement has benefited from
the same-sex marriage cases.
A. Some Lesbian and Gay Couples in the U.S. Are Now Married
The aftermath of Brown shows just how difficult it can sometimes be to translate
judicially conferred rights into meaningful equality on the ground. The desegregation
of schools turned out to be an extremely complicated matter. Meaningful desegrega-
tion began in the South only ten years after Brown.250 Furthermore, it was necessary
for federal courts throughout the country to oversee school desegregation plans for
decades after Brown.25" ' Some of the delays were undoubtedly the result of foot-
dragging on the part of state and local officials. But the pace of school desegregation
was also slowed down considerably by factors such as the pervasive housing segre-
gation that exists within many municipalities and the flight by whites from urban
24' Unintended Consequences Stem from Ohio Marriage Amendment, LESBIAN/GAY L.
NOTES (Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2005, at 74. An
appellate court has since rejected the notion that the amendment limits the criminal prose-
cution of domestic violence. See State v. Newell, No. 2004CA00264, 2005 WL 1364937 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 31, 2005).
249 See Op. Mich. Att'y Gen. 7171 (2005), available at 2005 WL 639112. A trial court
has disagreed with the attorney general's interpretation of the amendment. See Nat'l Pride
at Work, Inc., v. Granholm, No. 05-368-CZ, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27,2005).
Conservatives, apparently invigorated by their electoral victories in 2004, have con-
tinued to flex their political muscles on gay rights issues. In Montgomery County, Maryland,
a parents' group successfully pressured the school board to eliminate a health education course
that included a discussion of homosexuality. See Michael Janofsky, Gay Rights Battlefields
Spread to Public Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 2005, at A18. Social conservatives in Oklahoma
succeeded in getting the legislature to enact a resolution calling on libraries to limit children's
access to books with a gay theme while gay rights opponents in Alabama are seeking to have
lawmakers prohibit state spending on school books that portray homosexuality in a favorable
light. See id.
250 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
2.1 See generally Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REv.
1157 (2000) (discussing school desegregation litigation).
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municipalities to suburban ones. 2 These complicating factors are not easily addressed
through judicially-imposed solutions.253
It has proven easier and quicker to "integrate" marriage than it was to integrate
public schools. In fact, in Massachusetts, the former was done literally overnight.
If lesbian and gay couples in that state had sought marriage licenses on May 16, 2004,
their applications would have been denied. And yet, a day later, the licenses were
issued without any difficulty.'
The fact that there are now thousands of lesbian and gay couples married in
Massachusetts is, of course, of great importance to them. 5 They now enjoy full
equality under Massachusetts law, with the same rights, benefits, and obligations
afforded to married heterosexual couples. Married same-sex couples in Massachusetts
no longer have to endure the burdens and humiliations, both large and small, that accom-
panied the state's previous refusal to recognize the legal validity of their relationships.
It has not been, however, only the married same-sex couples in Massachusetts that
have benefited from their marital status. The gay rights movement in general has also
benefited and will likely continue to do so. The existence of thousands of married
same-sex couples in Massachusetts is extremely helpful from an educational and polit-
ical perspective. Significant numbers of Massachusetts residents now have neighbors
and co-workers who are lesbian and gay and who are married. The idea that it is
252 See Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: Hypersegregated Housing Patterns and the
Failure of School Desegregation, 9 WIDENERL. SYMP. J. 55-56 (2002); see also Finkelman,
supra note 190, at 1007 (arguing that "[m]ost [school] segregation today is due to housing
patterns, employment patterns, and private decisionmaking.").
253 This became especially true after the Supreme Court held that suburban schools did not
have to participate in metropolitan desegregation plans unless they had contributed to the
racial segregation of city schools. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
254 Yvonne Abraham & Michael Paulson, Wedding Day: First Gays Marry; Many Seek
Licenses, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 2004, at Al (reporting that more than one thousand lesbian
and gay couples applied for marriage licenses on the first day in which they were available);
Pam Belluck, Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2004, at Al (reporting that "[o]n the first day..., the issuing of licenses and the marriage cere-
monies proceeded without many snags or confrontations."). The only disputed issue became
whether same-sex couples from other states were eligible to marry in Massachusetts. Id. at A2 1.
The governor, relying on a 1913 state law that prohibits the issuance of licenses to couples if
the marriages would not be recognized in their home states, ordered that non-resident same-sex
couples not be allowed to marry. Pam Belluck, Governor Seeks to Invalidate Some Same-Sex
Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A14. The 1913 law was aimed in part at restrict-
ing interracial marriages. See Raphael Lewis, Law Curbing Out-of-State Couples Faces a
Challenge, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 2004, at B 1. The constitutionality of that law is currently
before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Jonathan Saltzman, SJCHears Challenge
to Marriage Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2005, at B 1.
2" Over six thousand same-sex couples were married in Massachusetts during the first
nine months after same-sex marriages in the state became legal. See William Lee Adams, Gay
to Wed, NEWSWEEK, May 23, 2005, at 12.
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possible for two women or two men to be married to each other seems intrinsically
contradictory to many Americans.256 It is reasonable to believe that many of the neigh-
bors and co-workers of married same-sex couples in Massachusetts are realizing that
what they share with lesbian and gay couples (in terms, for example, of commitment
and love for their partners and families) is greater and more important than the dif-
ferences as represented by the gender of the parties.
Studies have shown that a person's opinion about homosexuality frequently de-
pends on whether that person knows someone who is lesbian or gay.257 Individuals
are more likely to be supportive of gay rights positions if they know someone who is
openly lesbian or gay.258 It would be consistent with these findings for the support of
gay rights in general and same-sex marriage in particular to increase once large seg-
ments of the population get to know lesbian and gay couples as married couples.
Although opponents of gay rights frequently categorize same-sex marriage as a
threat to the institution of marriage and to the well-being of society,259 the experience
in Massachusetts shows otherwise. No heterosexual couple in that state has gotten
divorced, and no heterosexual couple has failed to get married, because of Goodridge.26
It is easy for opponents of same-sex marriage to use fiery rhetoric about how society
will be endangered if same-sex couples are permitted to marry. In Massachusetts,
that possibility has been replaced with reality with no evidence of harm to anyone.
Although implacable opponents of same-sex marriage are unlikely to allow facts
such as these to weaken their resolve, more open-minded citizens are likely to be
persuaded of the moral legitimacy behind claims for gay equality by simply observ-
ing and getting to know lesbian and gay couples as married couples.
In fact, if schools in the South had somehow been fully integrated two years after
Brown (in the same way that marriage in Massachusetts is fully "integrated" two years
after Goodridge), the worst fears of segregationists would have been proven then to
256 See Russell Shorto, What's Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage? (It's the Gay Part),
N.Y. TIMEs, June 19, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 37 (noting opposition to same-sex marriage by
some on the ground "that the definition of the word 'marriage' necessarily involves one person
from each sex").
257 See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, "Some of My Best Friends": Inter-
group Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Gay Men and
Lesbians, 22 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 412 (1996); Gregory M. Herek & Erik
K. Glunt, Interpersonal Contact and Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Gay Men: Results
from a National Survey, 30 J. SEX RES. 239 (1993).
28 See Joseph Shapiro et al., Straight Talk About Gays, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
5, 1993, at 42, 46 (noting that seventy-three percent of those who know someone who is gay
favor civil rights protections while only fifty-five percent of those who do not know gay people
support such protections).
'9 Shorto, supra note 256, at 41 (noting views held by many social conservatives that same-
sex marriage represents a threat to the stability of society).
260 In fact, Massachusetts has the lowest divorce rate in the nation. See Editorial, Happy
Anniversary, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 2005, at A14.
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have been unfounded. If civil rights proponents had been able to show in 1956 what
we take for granted today, namely, that it is indeed possible for children of different
races to receive an education in the same institution without negative consequences
for the students, the institution, or society, it is likely that open-minded citizens across
the country would have rejected the resistance to Brown put forward by Southern
segregationists much earlier than they did.26'
It is instructive to compare the status of same-sex marriage today with that of inter-
racial marriage almost sixty years ago. In 1948, the Supreme Court of California in
Perez v. Lippold struck down, on federal constitutional grounds, California's ban
against interracial marriages.2 62 At the time, thirty states had anti-miscegenation
laws,263 and an overwhelming number of Americans supported the racial marriage
bans. 264 Slowly but steadily those bans were repealed so that by the time the United
States Supreme Court in 1967 held that the laws violated the Constitution,265 only
sixteen states still had them in the books.266 When Perez was first decided, it seemed
as if the California court was pushing the fringes of constitutional doctrine given
that "Jim Crow segregation was still regarded as constitutionally permissible. 267
And yet, when the Supreme Court, less than twenty years later, reached the same
conclusion, there was little opposition or resistance.2 61 It is likely that Goodridge
will have a similar impact on the question of same-sex marriage as Perez did on the
issue of interracial marriage. 269
The early indications of the educational and political benefits for the gay rights
movement arising from the recognition of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts are
promising. In November 2004, six months after the state first issued marriage licenses
to same-sex couples, all of the Massachusetts state legislators who opposed the con-
stitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage were reelected, while several of those
who supported it were not.27° In addition, in special elections held in 2005, three
261 See supra notes 206-216 and accompanying text.
262 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). The case was originally reported as Perez
v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948).
263 RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION
259 (2003).
264 See Perez, 198 P.2d at 31-32.
265 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
266 See KENNEDY, supra note 263, at 259.
267 Id.
268 See id. at 278.
269 As Mary Bonauto, the lead plaintiffs' attorney in Goodridge, notes: "[M]any of us are
now grateful that the [Perez] court saw the issue as one of human equality and dignity and broke
what had been a logjam of discrimination." Bonauto, supra note 25, at 68.
270 See Happy Anniversary, supra note 260, at A14; Frank Phillips, Bid Seen Weakening
to Ban Gay Marriage: Amendment Foes May Get Majority, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2005,
at Al.
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legislators who opposed gay marriage were replaced with ones who favor it.271
Furthermore, a recent poll of Massachusetts residents found that fifty-six percent
of them support same-sex marriage,272 an increase of six percentage points from the
time Goodridge was decided.2 73 Another recent survey found that eighty-four percent
of Massachusetts residents believe that same-sex marriage has had a positive impact,
or no impact at all, on the quality of life in the state.274 Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the Massachusetts legislature in 2005, after giving preliminary approval to a
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, resoundingly rejected the amend-
ment when it came up for a second vote.275
The trend in Massachusetts on the issue of same-sex marriage is consistent with
what happened in Vermont after the state legislature there enacted its civil unions
law.276 Although some legislators who voted for the law were not returned to office
in the election that followed the enactment,277 civil unions in Vermont today are widely
supported by citizens and elected officials alike.278 Experience with the actual con-
sequences (or lack thereof) of providing legal recognition to same-sex relationships
has made all of the difference in Vermont. Many initial opponents of granting legal
271 See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Plans to Revisit Amendment on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2005, at A13.
272 See Raphael Lewis, Group to Seek Referendum Against Gay Marriage Plan Would
Counter Bid for Civil Unions, BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 2005, at B1.
273 See supra text accompanying note 75.
274 See Adams,.supra note 255, at 12.
275 The legislature, which in March of 2004 had approved the amendment by a vote of
105-92, overwhelmingly rejected the same amendment in September 2005 by a vote of 157-39.
See Raphael Lewis, After the Vote, Both Sides in Debate Energized, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 15,
2005, at Al. "The lopsided defeat for the amendment was largely due to the fact that 55 law-
makers more than 25 percent of the Legislature who had supported the amendment last year
switched and voted no.... Seventeen of the Legislature's 18 freshman lawmakers also voted
against the amendment." Id. One legislator - who voted for the amendment the first time but
voted against it the second time - explained that "[glay marriage has begun and life has not
changed for the citizens of the commonwealth, with the exception of those who can now marry
who could not before." Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIviES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A14. Another legislator who changed his mind noted that
"[wihen I looked into the eyes of the children living with [same-sex married] couples, I decided
that I don't feel at this time that same-sex marriage has hurt the commonwealth in any way. In
fact, I would say that in my view it has had a good effect for the children in these families." Id.
276 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
277 See DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE 257-60 (2004).
278 See id. at 261-62; see also David Moats, Op-Ed, The Lessons of Vermont May Help
in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2003, at A19 [hereinafter Moats, Lessons of
Vermont]. Exit polls after the 2004 election found that seventy-six percent of Vermonters
favored making marriage (forty percent) or civil unions (thirty-six percent) available to same-
sex couples. See David Gram, Gay Unions Gaining Acceptance in Vermont, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 6,2004, available athttp://www.boston.com/newsllocal/vermontlarticles/2004/
1 1/06/gay-unions-gaining-acceptancein_vermont.
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recognition to same-sex couples in that state have learned that allowing lesbians and
gay men to be civilly unionized has had no negative policy repercussions and has not
affected or endangered the relationships of married heterosexual couples or the social
institution of marriage.279 The same reaction appears to be taking hold in Massachusetts
with respect to same-sex marriage.
Finally, the educational and political benefits arising from the fact that there are
now same-sex married couples in Massachusetts will not be limited to that state.
Although most jurisdictions, at least in the short term, are unlikely to recognize the
Massachusetts marriages unless required to do so by courts,28 ° the fact that soon thou-
sands of Massachusetts lesbian and gay married couples will travel or move to other
states is likely to have a positive impact for gay rights across the country. As these
couples travel or move, they will be able to legitimately put themselves forward as
having been married in another jurisdiction, bringing attention to the unequal treat-
ment and unfairness that accompanies the legal recognition of relationships as marital
in some states but not in others.'
B. Civil Unions as the Moderate Alternative
As already noted, the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown had a radicalizing effect
on Southern politics on matters related to racial segregation.2 2 The effect of Goodridge
and other same-sex marriage cases favoring lesbian and gay plaintiffs2 8 3 has been
more complicated. Although it is undeniable that the successes of the same-sex
marriage litigation strategy have led to an entrenchment of anti-gay marriage views
as reflected in the constitutional amendments and statutory enactments that have
reinforced pre-existing marital bans, 28' the marriage cases, and the national debate
that they have engendered, have also moderated the views of many Americans on
the broader issue of whether same-sex relationships deserve some form of legal
279 Cf Howard Dean, Op-Ed, Vermont's Lessons on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, May
17, 2004, at Al1; Moats, Lessons of Vermont, supra note 278.
280 For a brief and helpful summary of interstate recognition issues, see generally Andrew
Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook
for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143 (2005).
28' A national survey conducted in May 2005 by the University of New Hampshire on behalf
of the Boston Globe found that thirty-seven percent of Americans supported same sex marriage.
See Law and Civil Rights, PollingReport.com, http://pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited
Mar. 7, 2006). When asked, however, whether Massachusetts same-same sex marriages should
be recognized in other states, forty-six percent said "yes." Id.
282 See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
283 1 am thinking in particular of Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), and Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
284 See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
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recognition. In particular, civil unions have emerged as an appealing alternative to
marriage embraced by those who believe that marriage should be restricted to different-
sex couples but who also believe that the law should provide some recognition of
and protection to same-sex relationships.
Only five years after Vermont created what, at the time, was the highly contro-
versial institution of civil unions, a majority of Americans support those unions for
same-sex couples.285 As a result, many elected officials have embraced civil unions
as a compromise position between denying same-sex couples all legal recognition
and offering them full access to the institution of marriage. In fact, the proposed
federal constitutional amendment that would ban same-sex marriage floundered in
Congress, in part, because of the uncertainty over whether the proposed language
also prohibited states from enacting civil unions.2"6 There was sufficient support
among at least some opponents of same-sex marriage for civil unions that it derailed
the amendment's progress in Congress.2 87 Even conservative politicians who are
strongly opposed to same-sex marriage, such as President Bush, have stated that
they support civil unions.288
What was to many, only a few years ago, a radical idea (that lesbians and gay men
should have the same rights and benefits afforded to married couples under state law,
albeit under the auspices of an alternative legal regime), has now, in effect, become
a mainstream alternative to same-sex marriage. It is exceedingly unlikely that civil
unions would have the support of so many Americans today, and thus of so many
elected officials, but for the ability of the same-sex marriage litigation strategy to
place the issue of the lack of legal recognition of lesbian and gay relationships squarely
285 A national poll taken in July of 2005 found that fifty-three percent of Americans
support civil unions, up from forty-eight percent in August of 2004. See Marriage: By the
Numbers, ADvOCATE, Sept. 13, 2005, at 16 (reporting on a poll conducted by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press); see also Shorto, supra note 256, at 37 ("The fact that civil
unions, as well as efforts to extend specific rights and benefits to gay couples, receive significant
support in polls suggests that many who object to gay marriage nevertheless see an underlying
civil rights issue.").
286 See Carl Hulse, Backers Revise Amendment on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,2004,
at A21.
287 See id.; Mary Leonard, GOP Divided On Marriage Amendment: Republicans Grapple
with Same-Sex Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2004, at Al; Mary Leonard, Marriage
Measure Revised to Allow Some State Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23, 2004, at Al; Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, Amendment's Backers Try Again on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June
23, 2004, at A20.
288 A few days before the November 2004 election, President Bush stated in an interview
with a reporter that he supported civil unions. See Wildman, supra note 181, at 40. M. Jodi
Rell, the Republican Governor of Connecticut, has also supported civil unions while arguing
that the institution of marriage should be maintained for opposite-sex couples exclusively.
See Yardley, supra note 3.
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before the American public. 2 9 The political debate in a growing number of states is
no longer whether lesbian and gay couples deserve legal recognition; instead, the
debate is about what type of legal recognition they deserve.29" That in and of itself
represents considerable progress for gay rights proponents.
289 Jason Pierceson argues that the same-sex marriage litigation in Hawaii and Vermont,
which led to a reciprocal benefits law in the former and civil unions in the latter, played a crucial
role in framing the political debate regarding the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.
JASON PIERCESON, COURTS, LIBERALISM, AND RIGHTS: GAY LAW AND Poimcs IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 192 (2005). He notes that the
litigation resulted in a discussion of lesbian and gay civil rights that
demanded a consideration of equality. Over and over again, one sees evi-
dence that the intention of many political actors was to recognize same-
sex relationships on a level similar to heterosexual marriage. Without
the legal arguments and decisions to frame this debate, it can be argued
that only arguments based on tradition and the desire to preserve the
institution of marriage would have had any salience.
Id.
290 See Bossin, supra note 243, at 418-20 (discussing actions taken by legislatures in
California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont to provide legal recognition of same-sex
relationships). Maine has also recently enacted a domestic partnership registry that inter alia
allows partners to inherit from each other without a will and make funeral and burial arrange-
ments. See 2004 Me. Legis. Serv. 672 (West); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710
(2005). In 2005, the Maryland legislature overwhelmingly approved a measure giving un-
married partners, including same-sex ones, the ability to make health care decisions for each
other and to enjoy hospital visitation rights. See James Dao, Partners Bill Is Vetoed by
Governor in Maryland, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2005, at A1O. Even though the governor vetoed
the bill, legislators have vowed to try again in the next legislative session. Id.
The progress has not been limited to liberal states. The Virginia legislature, for example,
recently enacted a measure that permits insurance companies and businesses to extend health in-
surance coverage to same-sex couples. See Marriage & Partnership Legislation Notes, LESBIAN/
GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2005, at
77. Also recently, the members of a committee of the Utah Senate, with the support of the
Republican governor, unanimously approved a bill providing some domestic partnership rights,
including rights to hospital visitation and intestacy, to any two adults. See Marriage & Partner-
ship Legislative Notes, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y.,
New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2005, at 28. Although the bill eventually failed to pass the full senate, see
Gay Ban Unmended, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Feb. 2, 2005, at A3, the support that it did receive
among otherwise conservative legislators shows that the debate over same-sex marriage can have
some positive impact even in states that have approved constitutional amendments banning same-
sex marriage. See also E.J. Graff, Marital Blitz, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 2006, at 41, 42 (reporting
that in 2005 "Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and Topeka - hardly liberal bastions - passed LGBT
antidiscrimination laws [and] Virginia's governor and Salt Lake City's mayor extended health-
insurance coverage to government employees' same-sex domestic partners.").
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C. Progress on Other Gay Rights Issues and the Overcoming of Invisibility
I have focused so far on the benefits arising from the same-sex marriage liti-
gation strategy in matters related to the legal recognition of lesbian and gay relation-
ships, whether in the form of marriage or in the form of alternative institutions such
as civil unions."' Although it is not possible to establish a firm causal connection, it
is reasonable to believe that the national debate engendered by the same-sex marriage
cases regarding the lives and relationships of lesbians and gay men has also had a
positive impact on gay rights issues that do not involve relationship recognition. Even
though the issue of same-sex marriage continues to strongly divide the country, other
gay-related policy matters, such as whether the state should criminalize same-gender
sexual conduct or provide protection against discrimination and hate crimes on the
basis of sexual orientation, have become considerably less controversial. For example,
by the time Lawrence v. Texas was decided,292 the majority of states had eliminated,
either legislatively or through judicial decree, their sodomy statutes.2 93 Since 1993,
which was the year in which the Baehr v. Lewin decision was issued by the Hawaii
Supreme Court,294 ten states, as well as the District of Columbia, have enacted laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 295 while twenty have
passed laws addressing hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation.296 There has
29' See supra notes Parts IV.A and IV.B.
292 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
293 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THEAPARTHEID OFTHE CLOSET
328-37 (1999) (listing state sodomy statutes).
294 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
295 The states are Illinois (2005), Maine (2005), Maryland (2001), Minnesota (1993),
Nevada (1994), New Mexico (2003), New Hampshire (1997), New York (2002), Rhode Island
(1995), and Washington (2006). See Statewide Anti-Discrimination Laws and Policies, Human
Rights Campaign, available at http://hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=YourCommunity&
Template= ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentD=14821 (last visited Feb. 3,
2005). There are presently a total of seventeen states that prohibit discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. See id.
296 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West
2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-181j-1 (West 2005); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304
(2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 846-51 (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.031 (West 2005);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151 (2005); 2005
Md. Laws 571; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 10-301-06 (West 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 265:39 (2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.035 (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §28-111
(2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §41.690 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:16-1 (West
2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18B-3 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§240.30-31
(McKinney 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2710 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-19-38
(2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §40-35-114 (2005); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.47 (Vernon
2005). There are presently thirty-one states that penalize hate crimes based on sexual orien-
tation. See Statewide Hate Crimes Laws, Human Rights Campaign, available at http://www.
hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=YourCommunity&Template=/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfm&Contentld=19445 (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
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also been progress in the area of parent-child relationships, with New Hampshire re-
pealing its ban against adoption by lesbians and gay men297 and several states, includ-
ing California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont, allowing gay and lesbian
couples to adopt jointly.2 98
The national debate engendered by the same-sex marriage cases has contributed
to progress in all of these areas because the marriage issue has increased the visibility
of lesbians and gay men in ways that no other gay rights issue had done before. The
cases have, in effect, helped to humanize lesbians and gay men by encouraging (at
least some) skeptical Americans to better understand the full lives of those with a
same-gender sexual orientation. The fact that the gay rights movement has placed
such importance on the legal recognition of same-sex relationships challenges the
stereotype of lesbians and gay men as individuals who are only interested in sexual
gratification.' 99 The marriage litigation, in other words, has contributed to the gap
between the perception of lesbians and gay men as individuals defined exclusively
through their sexual conduct and the observable reality of lesbians and gay men as full
human beings who, among other traits, care for and love others.
Relatedly, the same-sex marriage litigation has required citizens and elected of-
ficials alike to think through and articulate their views on the lives and relationships
of lesbian and gay people. Although those views, of course, do not always correspond
with gay rights positions, the important point is that many Americans have been
forced to take a position on these important issues rather than continue to pretend that
lesbians and gay men either do not exist or that their interests are not even worth
considering. In this sense, Goodridge and the other same-sex marriage cases have had
a positive impact on the status of gay Americans that is similar to that which Brown
had on the status of black Americans.
In many ways, overcoming invisibility is the first step in successfully demand-
ing basic civil rights. It is perhaps no coincidence that Invisible Man, Ralph Ellison's
famous novel about the pain and misery associated with the invisibility of the black
297 N.H. Law Repeals Ban on Gay Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1999, at B5.
298 CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §45a-727 (West 2004);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:3-43 (West 2002); see also John J. Goldman, N.J. Settlement OKs
Adoptions by Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997, at Al; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1204(e)(4) (2002). But see MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (West 2002) (prohibiting same-sex
couples from adopting); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §7502-1.4(A) (West 1998 & Supp. 2005)
(prohibiting state courts and agencies from "recogniz[ing] an adoption by more than one
individual of the same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction"). The constitutionality
of a Florida statute, which prohibits all lesbians and gay men from adopting, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.042(3) (West 2002), was upheld in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children &
Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 827 (1 lth Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
299 See Shorto, supra note 256, at 41 (noting that "in conservative Christian circles...
homosexuality is not an innate condition but a hedonistic way of living, one devoted to
partying, drugs and wanton sex that ends, often, in illness and early death.").
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man in America, was published only two years before Brown.3" Black people after
Brown may still have been hated by some and feared by others, but they were no
longer invisible. After Brown, it no longer was tenable to reject out of hand the
claims by African Americans to equal citizenship.
The same applies to lesbians and gay men and their position in society today. The
same-sex marriage cases, and the significant and ongoing national debate that they
have engendered, makes it impossible for most Americans to ignore the reality that
some of their co-citizens are lesbians and gay men who are entitled to some rights and
protections under law. As a result, the idea of decriminalizing sodomy or of pro-
tecting lesbians and gay men from the harms associated with discrimination and hate
crimes no longer seems problematic in the same ways that it did only a generation ago.
To illustrate how far the gay rights movement has come in the years since the
same-sex marriage issue exploded onto the national scene, it is helpful to contrast two
issues faced by two Republican presidents twenty years apart. In the mid-1980s, as
the devastation wrought by AIDS on the gay community (among others) was becom-
ing apparent, one of the political goals of the gay rights and AI)S movements was to
pressure President Ronald Reagan to utter the word "AIDS" in public.3"' It was
thought at the time that the President's utterance of the word would be an implicit
recognition of the existence of people with AIDS, many of whom were gay. And
when the President did begin to say "AIDS" in public, after thousands of gay men
(among others) had died of the disease, the gay rights and AIDS movements con-
sidered that a belated political victory of sorts.30 2
Fast forward almost twenty years later to early 2004 when President George W.
Bush was forced to take a public position on same-sex marriage by explicitly support-
ing a federal constitutional amendment that would ban same-sex marriages. That
position, of course, is inconsistent with the views of the gay rights movement, but
the important point for my purposes here is to note how President Bush, as a result
of the same-sex marriage litigation, was forced to acknowledge (albeit indirectly)
the existence of the lives and relationships of lesbians and gay men. That acknowl-
edgment in and of itself constitutes progress for the movement because it reduces
300 RALPH ELLISON, INVIsIBLE MAN (1952).
301 See RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLMCS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS
EPIDEMIC 579 (1987).
302 The first time President Reagan said the word "AIDS" in public was at a press
conference in 1985. See JAMES KINSFLLA, COVERING THE PLAGUE: AIDS AND THE AMERICAN
MEDIA 266 (1989). He stated at that time that he understood why parents did not want their
children to be "'in school with these kids who have 'AIDS."' Id. President Reagan waited
until 1987 to give his first major address on the epidemic. See Timothy E. Cook & David C.
Colby, The Mass-Mediated Epidemic: The Politics of AIDS on the Nightly Network News,
in AIDS: THE MAKING OFA CHRONIC DISEASE 84, 111 (Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M. Fox eds.,
1992); see also SHILTS, supra note 301, at 596 ("By the time President Reagan had delivered
his first speech on the epidemic of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 36,058 Americans
had been diagnosed with the disease; 20,849 had died.").
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the invisibility of lesbians and gay men. President Bush may not believe that same-
sex relationships merit marital recognition, but he cannot, as President Reagan did
twenty years earlier, pretend that gay people do not exist.
I argued in the previous section that but for the same-sex marriage cases, it is
highly unlikely that a majority of Americans would today approve of civil unions.3 °3
The same cannot be said of progress in policy matters that do not involve relation-
ship recognition. It is likely, in other words, that some states, for example, would
have enacted laws protecting lesbians and gay men against discrimination and laws
criminalizing hate crimes on the basis of sexual orientation in the absence of the
same-sex marriage cases. The cases, however, by decreasing the invisibility of lesbians
and gay men and by drawing attention to the problems and burdens associated with
their status as second-class citizens, have made the claims by the gay rights move-
ment in non-marital matters more normatively compelling and politically powerful.
If we balance the costs associated with the backlash to the same-sex marriage
cases against the benefits, both direct and indirect, created by those cases, I believe,
as I have argued here, that the latter outweigh the former. It would be a mistake,
therefore, for gay rights supporters to conclude that the same-sex marriage litigation
has been a strategic mistake because of the backlash that it has provoked. In my esti-
mation, gay rights, despite the backlash, are ahead of where they would have been
in the absence of the litigation.
It is not clear, however, that the same can be said once we shift the focus from
looking backward to looking forward. It is fair to say that the movement has probably
reached the point of diminishing returns when it comes to the progress that can result
from judicial successes in the area of marriage equality. The chances that those suc-
cesses will be overturned by voters are simply too great for the movement to continue
to rely so heavily on the courts. The time has come, on the issue of marriage, to shift
the emphasis away from the courts and toward the political and legislative arenas.
304
The movement, in other words, must begin to rely less on lawyers in the courtroom
and more on reaching out to moderate Americans in neighborhoods, schools, and
places of work and worship. Much of this can be accomplished by lesbians and gay
men living openly, as single individuals and as couples, with dignity and courage so
that skeptical but open-minded heterosexuals can become convinced that they have
nothing to fear or lose if the society were to accept lesbians and gay men as true
equals. At the same time, there must be increased efforts at political organizing and
303 See supra Part IV.B.
304 I do not mean to suggest that the litigation option should be abandoned altogether in
the pursuit of marriage equality. The lawsuits still have a role to play in states where prior
gay rights victories in the legislative and judicial arenas are likely to make the recognition
of same-sex marriage politically palatable. See supra note 25. A key question that should be
asked by those who want to litigate on behalf of marriage equality in any given state is whether
it is likely that legislators or voters will overturn judicial victories, If the answer to that question
is either yes or uncertain, then it would be prudent to wait on the lawsuit.
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grass-roots mobilizing to convince legislators of the need to provide at least some
legal protections to the relationships and families of lesbians and gay men.3 °5
This way of effecting change can be slow and laborious, without guarantees of
success. Nonetheless, we have already seen some progress in the political and legis-
lative arenas. Recently, the Connecticut legislature enacted a civil union law3 6 while
the California legislature approved a comprehensive domestic partnership statute.30 7
What is particularly promising about these legislative developments is that they were
the result of elected officials acting on their own, presumably at the behest of their
constituents, in the absence of court-mandated change. Unlike their counterparts in
Massachusetts and Vermont, lawmakers in Connecticut and California provided signif-
icant forms of legal recognition to lesbian and gay relationships that are important and
meaningful because they wanted to and not because a court forced them to do so.
30 8
Although I am skeptical that these legislative successes would have been possible this
quickly in the absence of the national debate engendered by the same-sex marriage
litigation in states like Massachusetts and Vermont, it seems clear that, going forward,
lawsuits on their own will not, at least in the short run, provide meaningful equality
for lesbians and gay men in the area of relationship recognition because of the like-
lihood of voter backlash.
To return once again to Brown, de jure racial segregation did not end with the
issuance of that opinion. Instead, the opinion created the necessary legal and polit-
ical space that allowed other institutions, most notably the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government, eventually to become involved to remedy what
the Court had declared was unacceptable inequality. Similarly, same-sex marriage
opinions such as Goodridge are helpful in focusing national attention on the equality
claims of lesbians and gay men. But Goodridge, like Brown, is the beginning and
not the end. The more difficult and more time-consuming project entails reaching
out to the hearts and minds of straight Americans; it is they who must eventually be
convinced that the inequality inherent in prohibiting lesbians and gay men from
marrying is indeed unacceptable.
305 Since the electoral defeats of 2004, gay rights advocacy groups have developed a fifteen-
year strategic plan to mobilize politically across the country on behalf of same-sex marriage. See
Graff, supra note 290, at 41. The effort includes a plan to disburse funds to candidates for
elected office who support gay rights positions and to build coalitions with civil rights groups
and unions. See id. at 42-43. The strategy also calls for the reaching out to individual voters.
In California, for example, activists intend to have "two million conversations with individual
Americans about why gay and lesbian couples need and deserve access to [marriage]." Id. at 44.
'06 See Yardley, supra note 3.
307 CAL. FAM. CODE. §§ 297-299.6 (West 2004). The California Domestic Partner Regis-
tration Act was enacted in 1999 and became fully effective in 2005. See Bossin, supra note
243, at 419. In September 2005, the California legislature became the first in the country to
enact a bill allowing same-sex marriages. Governor Arnold Swarzenegger vetoed the bill
three weeks later. California: No Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A18.
308 See Yardley, supra note 3 (noting that many of the Connecticut "lawmakers said...
that their support for civil unions was less a defensive act against a potential court ruling than
the obvious next step for a state with a 15-year history of expanding gay rights.").
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CONCLUSION
Although it is understandable that so many gay rights supporters feel despair and
anguish in the face of the severe backlash against gay rights that we are currently
experiencing, Brown and its aftermath teach us that backlash is a part and parcel of
the history of civil rights struggles in this country. Those struggles are, at their core,
about getting the majority to give up privileges, both tangible and intangible, that rein-
force their perceived superiority. The fact that, prior to Brown, laws and regulations
kept blacks out of the white (and much better) schools created and reinforced the view
in the minds of many whites that they were superior to blacks.' And for years after
Brown, many of those whites, especially in the South, did everything they could to
retain the long standing regime of privileges that benefited them at the expense of
blacks.310
Similarly today, the maintaining of the institution of marriage as exclusively hetero-
sexual reinforces the views of many straight individuals that they are morally superior
to lesbians and gay men because their relationships are more meaningful, valuable,
and important. And despite cases such as Goodridge - indeed, because of cases such
as Goodridge - many heterosexuals will do everything they can to maintain the long
standing regime of privileges that benefit them at the expense of lesbians and gay men.
Once we understand that backlash is an intrinsic component of civil rights struggles
because those struggles aim to eliminate cherished privileges enjoyed by majority
groups, the (re)occurrence of backlash is both less threatening and surprising, if
not, at least in the short run, necessarily less harmful. The aftermaths to Brown and
Goodridge teach us that backlash is a predictable result of significant civil rights
advances. The aftermath to Brown, however, also teaches us that the backlash can
be overcome.
" See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 117-26, 134-45 and accompanying text.
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